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Abstract
We quantify the private and fiscal lifetime returns to higher education in Germany accounting for
the redistribution through the tax-and-transfer system, cohort effects, and the effect of income
pooling within households. For this purpose we build a dynamic microsimulation model that
simulates individual life cycles of a young German cohort in terms of several key variables, such
as employment, earnings, and household formation. To estimate the returns to higher education,
we link our dynamic microsimulation model to a tax-benefit simulator that allows converting gross
wages into disposable incomes. On average, we find private and fiscal returns that are substantially
higher than current market interest rates. However, analyzing the distribution of returns we also
find that there is a considerable share of young adults for whom we forecast vocational training, the
alternative to higher education, to be financially more rewarding. We demonstrate how the tax-
transfer system and income pooling within couple households affect private returns and decompose
the fiscal returns into its major components.
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1 Introduction
In the last decades an ever increasing share of young adults have entered higher education across
the globe.1 As a consequence, the OECD average of the adult population between 25 and 64 with a
tertiary education degree has increased from 20% in 1998 to 37% in 2018 (see OECD, 2020). It seems
likely that this trend will be increasing further in the future. Going to university, however, requires a
sizable financial investment of the individual in two dimensions. Directly, in terms of the tuition fees
to be paid. But also indirectly, by the income foregone under the alternative career, which could either
be a direct labor market entry or, in countries like Germany, entering a shorter and often remunerated
vocational training. At the same time, higher education also implies a substantial investment of the
state as academic tuition is usually highly subsidized by taxpayer money. In addition, the state forgoes
taxes and social security contributions for the time an individual is in academic training. The return
which individuals and the state reap from this investment comes later as academic graduates usually
earn more than non-graduates (hence, pay more taxes and social security contributions) and have a
lower risk of being unemployed (i.e. receive less transfers).
Estimating the earnings premium of education is often based on studying how economies re-
warded schooling during the life paths of older cohorts (see Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2018, for an
overview). However, for current decision makers, i.e. young adults and the state who is subsidizing
higher education, the returns that can be expected for a young cohort are crucial, accounting for
generational trends and institutional shifts. Therefore, the central goal of this paper is to forecast the
distribution of private and fiscal returns to higher education for young adults in Germany.2 We take
the life cycles of the 1980s cohort as the basis of the simulation. We choose this particular cohort
for two reasons. First, the individuals of the 1980s cohort are young enough to serve as a benchmark
for individuals currently choosing between different educational paths and for public decision makers
choosing the amount of higher education subsidization. And second, when measuring cohorts in ten-
year intervals, it is the youngest cohort for which the vast majority of individuals has already finished
post-secondary education, so that we can observe their early labor market biographies. In addition,
crucial transitions in terms of marriage, divorce, and fertility have already occurred for this cohort.
Estimating “returns to education” has a long history in the field of empirical economics. The
1Note that we use the terms “higher education”, “tertiary education”, and “academic training” interchangeably
throughout this paper.
2Note that our approach of forecasting returns to education of a young cohort is not equivalent to estimating ex
ante returns according to Cunha and Heckman (2007). Cunha and Heckman (2007) define ex ante returns as the
returns individuals are expecting at the time they make their educational choice, given their (restricted) information set.
Importantly, the latter also includes information which is unobserved by the econometrician, such as preferences and
skills. Courtioux et al. (2014) show under which (rather restrictive) assumptions the estimated returns can be interpreted
as true ex ante returns.
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traditional approach is to estimate a Mincer (1974)-type (log) earnings equation with the schooling
level in years and work experience as covariates, and to interpret the schooling coefficient as the
internal rate of return to an additional year of schooling (see Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2018).
However, as Heckman et al. (2006, 2008) have stressed, this coefficient only yields an (internal) rate
of return to education under some strong assumptions, i.e. (i) there are no taxes (and transfers), (ii)
no tuition costs and no earnings while in education, (iii) there is no loss in working life associated
with education, (iv) earnings functions are multiplicatively separable in experience and education, i.e.
log-earnings–experience profiles are parallel across education levels, and (v) marginal returns being
equal to average returns. Moreover, when estimation of the Mincer equation is based on a synthetic
cohort approach (where a single cross-section approximates a cohort’s life cycle) (vi) changing skill
price differentials across time are ruled out.
In the case of higher education, assumptions (i) and (iii) are clearly violated for most countries.
Additionally, several studies present empirical evidence against parallelism of log earnings–experience
profiles (iv) and against stationarity (vi) (e.g., for the U.S. see Katz and Autor, 1999 and Heckman
et al., 2008; for Norway see Bhuller et al., 2017). Linearity of log wages in education (following from
(iv) and (v)) has been rejected in several studies for the U.S., pointing towards a non-zero role of
sheepskin effects (see Heckman et al., 2006, and the literature cited therein).
A second strand of the literature has explicitly relied on full individual life cycles to estimate private
and fiscal returns to education, sometimes called the “full discounting” approach (see Psacharopoulos,
1995). Bhuller et al. (2017) and Nybom (2017) observe Norwegian and Swedish adults from young
adulthood to retirement and are thereby able to compute ex-post life-cycle returns for these individuals.
As such panel data that contain full employment biographies for the whole population do not exist
for most countries, some studies rely on artificial life cycles instead (see OECD, 2019; Pfeiffer and
Stichnoth, 2019; Levell and Shaw, 2015; and de La Fuente and Jimeno, 2009). These studies typically
use recent cross-sectional data from which they construct full life-cycles, with the advantage that they
can account for some of the problems of the traditional approach mentioned above, particularly by
relaxing the assumptions (i)-(iv).
In our paper, we follow this second strand of the literature but use dynamic microsimulation mod-
els to simulate a number of individual life cycles of a young German cohort to estimate private and
fiscal returns to higher education. Dynamic microsimulation implies simulating individual life cycles
sequentially in terms of several key variables such as births, marriages, divorces, labor force participa-
tion, employment, and earnings. Importantly, this approach allows to incorporate taxes and transfers,
account for the length of working life, introduce a flexible modeling of wages, and correct for observ-
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able changes across birth year cohorts. Furthermore, dynamic microsimulation has the advantage of
capturing path dependencies and simulating heterogeneous life cycles. In particular, our simulation
strategy follows Courtioux et al. (2014) and Courtioux and Lignon (2016) who have estimated private
returns to higher education for France. Similarly, we build a dynamic microsimulation model for
Germany.
In addition to modules for the main transitions in family composition and labor market partic-
ipation, our model includes a tax-benefit component that allows to simulate taxes, transfers, and
social security contributions which are key for computing both private net returns and fiscal returns.
Moreover, explicitly modeling the partnering process further makes it possible to analyze how the
household context shapes the returns. The literature points out that a substantial share of households
fully or partially pool their income (Ponthieux and Meurs, 2015; Ponthieux, 2017; Beznoska, 2019).
In this case, an individual’s future consumption prospects also depend on the earnings of her future
spouse(s) and hence might be taken into account in the return calculation. We therefore compare the
returns under different degrees of income pooling. Finally, by simulating individual careers we are
able to examine the distribution of returns to higher education.
We find that higher education yields, on average and assuming no income pooling, a positive gross
return of 11.5% for men and 13.4% for women. The tax-and-transfer system shrinks these returns
to 8.7% and 9.7%, respectively. Furthermore, these returns are slightly reduced if we assume that
individuals fully share their income with their spouses. Being closely related to the private returns,
fiscal returns are 8.4% for men and 9.9% for women. At the same time, analyzing the returns for an
“average” biography masks considerable heterogeneities among individuals. For about one third of
individuals, we forecast negative private net present values.3 We show how these heterogeneities can
be explained by differences in hourly wages as well as employment, marriage, and fertility histories.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains the institutional background of post-secondary
education in Germany. Section 3 describes how we define and compute returns to higher education.
Section 4 introduces our dynamic microsimulation model and the data and Section 5 presents the
validation results of the model. Section 6 shows the results, Section 7 discusses them and Section 8
concludes.
3For technical reasons, we use two different concepts to evaluate the financial gains from higher education, “returns”
and “net present values”. We refer the reader to the discussion in section 3.
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2 Post-secondary education in Germany
2.1 Higher education and vocational training
In Germany, those who obtained a higher education entrance degree (Hochschulreife, henceforth
HEED) from secondary school can opt for higher education. As an alternative, these individuals
can also take up a vocational training (Berufsausbildung). Only a small share of individuals decide to
enter the labor market without any of these two types of training.4 Currently, about three out of four
individuals with a HEED enter higher education, while virtually the rest takes up vocational training
(Autorengruppe Bildungsberichtserstattung [ABB], 2018).
More precisely, we define “higher education” as attending either a university (Universität) or a
university of applied sciences (Hochschule für Angewandte Wissenschaften). While the two types
of institutions differ with respect to the content of tuition (universities of applied sciences have,
for instance, a larger focus on practical applications than universities), they are similar in terms of
study length. By law (Hochschulrahmengesetz ), the official study durations are three to four years
for bachelor and one to two years for master programs. In 2016, approximately 58% of new higher
education entrees entered a university and 42% a university of applied sciences (ABB, 2018).5
We define “vocational training” as attending either school-based training or dual training. School-
based training mainly takes place at a vocational school and usually does not involve any salary.6 In
contrast, dual training combines on-the-job training in a firm and classes at a vocational school, and
trainees receive an apprentice’s pay (Ausbildungsvergütung) which depends on training year, profession,
and region (Beicht, 2018). Of the individuals who obtained a HEED and start a vocational training
66% are in the dual training and 30% in the school-based training system (ABB, 2018).7 While
the duration of vocational training programs ranges between two and 3.5 years, the vast majority of
programs have a duration of three years (Frank and Walden, 2012).
While we focus on the life cycles of those who obtained a HEED in order to estimate the return
to higher education, we also simulate life paths of individuals with other educational degrees that are
common in Germany.8 The first category is defined by not obtaining any post-secondary degree, i.e.
individuals belonging to this class neither obtained a higher education nor a vocational training de-
4Following Biewen and Tapalaga (2017), this share is about 2% for the cohorts 1944-1986.
5Until the Bologna reforms in the early 2000s, the most common higher education degree at both types of institutions
was the diploma (Diplom). Since then, the diploma has gradually been replaced by bachelor and master degrees. We
assume that the diploma is equivalent to the combination of bachelor and master degree, since they are similar in terms
of official study length and content.
6Typical examples of a school-based training are health professions, such as medical or pharmaceutical technical
assistants.
7About 4% enter some form of pre-vocational training.
8Individuals who belong to these educational categories are potential spouses of those with a HEED and therefore,
for instance, contribute to the joint income of spouses.
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gree. The second category comprises individuals without a higher education entrance degree but with
a vocational training degree. Usually, these individuals graduated from a lower or middle secondary
school track (ABB, 2018). Figure 1 displays the gender-specific shares of the educational categories as
defined in this study, at ages 30–35 for the 1983–88 cohort, which are later used for the simulation.9
Figure 1: Distribution of post-secondary degrees, birth cohort 1983–88, in %
Notes: The figure displays the shares of combinations of secondary and post-secondary degrees for men and women in the
age group 30–35 in 2018. Vocational degree, no HEED = Vocational degree without higher education entrance degree;
Vocational degree, HEED = Vocational degree with higher education entrance degree. Source: Statistisches Bundesamt
(2018), own calculations.
2.2 Funding of post-secondary education
In Germany, both academic and vocational training are heavily subsidized. While a place at a uni-
versity or university of applied sciences currently costs, averaged across degrees and subjects, ap-
proximately 6500 Euros per year (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017), currently no federal state collects
tuition fees.10 However, usually all students have to pay a small fee for administrative costs and
the students’ representatives (Semesterbeitrag), which also includes subsidized public transport and
subsidized lunch at the university. A place at a vocational school is estimated to cost 4600 Euros
per year on average. However, there is a considerable cost difference between a place in dual training
(2900 Euros) and one in school-based training (7400 Euros). The difference is explained by the fact
9Note that this cohort classification does not fully correspond to the way we defined our cohort of interest (birth
years 1980–89). However, the education distribution should not differ much.
10Some West German states had introduced tuition fees in 2006/2007, but abolished them afterwards.
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that while dual training only partially takes place in a vocational school, school-based training means
that students spent most of their training time in schools (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017).
Beyond subsidized places in higher education and vocational training, students and vocational
trainees also receive direct financial support through grants and loans, especially through the Federal
Training Assistance Act, commonly referred to as BAföG. Whether an individual is eligible for support
depends on own and parental wealth and income. As of 2019, the maximum monthly amount an
individual could receive is 735 Euros for students and 590 Euros for individuals in vocational training.
Usually about half of the amount received has to be paid back later during working life.
3 The lifetime returns to higher education
3.1 Private returns
The literature has predominantly used two measures to assess the returns to education in a life-cycle
perspective. The first one is the (marginal) internal rate of return (IRR), which is the interest rate
that equates the income streams under investment and non-investment.11 The second one is the
net present value (NPV), defined as the difference between the present values of all benefits and the
(opportunity) costs that accrue to investing in education given a fixed interest rate r. As discussed
above, in Germany, for individuals who already obtained a HEED, not pursuing any post-secondary
path does not seem to be an attractive option, which is reflected in the fact that only very few
individuals follow this path. Therefore, for these individuals we consider vocational training to be the
relevant counterfactual for the higher education path. We use the above two measures to derive the
educational returns under different income concepts. Specifically, we distinguish between gross and
net income, and between different degrees of income pooling within couple households.
The reason to study the effect of income pooling is the following. Ponthieux and Meurs (2015),
Ponthieux (2017), and Beznoska (2019) provide empirical evidence for income pooling within house-
holds. At the same time, Eika et al. (2019) show for Germany and other countries that there is positive
educational assortative mating, i.e. individuals with similar education mate with one another more
frequently than would be expected under random mating. This implies that there might be an indirect
return to education: pursuing higher education is associated with a higher expected level of education
of potential partners and therefore with higher expected (shared) household income (Courtioux and
Lignon, 2016). Therefore, we take educational assortative mating into account and study the effect
11Originally, the term “internal rate of return” implied comparing an educational investment to a null project without
costs and returns. In contrast, the “marginal internal rate of return” implied comparing a high-investment project with
a low-investment project. In recent studies (see, e.g. Bhuller et al., 2017), however, the term “internal rate of return” is
used when comparing two investment projects. See Carneiro and Heckman (2003) for a more detailed discussion.
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income pooling has on the financial return to higher education.
We define Yi,t, the income of individual i in period t, as follows:
Yi,t = (1 − ρ)(labinci,t + capinci,t − taxesi,t − contribsi,t + benefitsi,t)
+ 0.5ρ(labinchh,t + capinchh,t − taxeshh,t − contribshh,t + benefitshh,t) (1)
+ 0.5τi,t(transfershh,t),
with 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 indicating the share of income that is pooled within individual i’s household hh
and τ = 1 if married and τ = 2 if unmarried. labinc is labor income from dependent employment
(after employer’s social security contributions) and self-employment. capinc is income from interest
on savings. taxes include income tax and capital withholding tax payments.12 contribs comprise
employee’s social security contributions as well as contributions to private health insurance contracts.13
benefits are individual-level benefits like unemployment benefits and parental leave benefits. All social
transfers granted at the household level are included in transfers. For the gross income measure, all
components except labinc and capinc are set to zero.
Importantly, we exclude pension insurance contributions and benefits from the analysis. This
means that neither are contributions to the statutory pension system included in contribs, nor are
received pensions included in benefits. One central feature of Germany’s public pension system is that
pension entitlements are, in general, equivalent to contributions paid, which implies a rather limited
effect on the private return. More relevant with respect to the private return could be extraneous
pension benefits such as the inclusion of time spent bringing up children in the pension insurance.
However, adding a detailed simulation module for the pension system and several additional transition
modules for pension-related outcomes is beyond the scope of this study.
We use the IRR as a measure to evaluate the return to higher education for a representative
life cycle, which is defined by income streams averaged over gender and migration background. The
reason is a technical one: Comparing incomes under higher education and vocational training, a unique
interest rate that equates the two income streams (i.e. a unique root) is only guaranteed if, over the
life cycle, there is exactly one change of sign. This is the case if, for instance, income from vocational
training is larger than income from higher education up to an age threshold and smaller beyond that
threshold. For (simulated) individual biographies, however, multiple sign changes can be expected to
12While we account for the value added tax when estimating fiscal returns (see below), we follow most of the literature
on net private returns to education and exclude it from the calculation of private returns.
13This definition is in line with the incidence assumption that about 50% of the overall social security contributions
are borne by the employees. While it deviates from the conventional assumption in the public finance literature that
employees bear the full burden, it ensures that our results are comparable to the literature on educational returns, where
most other studies work on the same incidence assumption.
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be the rule rather than the exception. Hence, we cannot compute the IRR on an individual basis, but
instead only use this measure when computing the return for an “average” individual, for whom there
are no multiple sign changes.














t define the average incomes under the two educational paths, higher education
(HE) and vocational training with higher education entrance degree (V OC), in period t and IRR is
the internal rate of return. Hence, investing in higher education is financially beneficial if the IRR is
larger than the market interest rate.
To assess the distribution of returns to higher education, we compute net present values (NPVs).
The NPV of higher education is computed as the difference between the simulated lifetime income
LTIHEi under higher education and its counterfactual LTI
V OC
i , i.e.
NPV privatei = LTI
HE
i − LTIV OCi , (3)


















g,t is the average income of group g individual i belongs to, defined by migration background
and gender, in period t (for a similar definition of counterfactual income see Courtioux et al. (2014)).
3.2 Fiscal returns
The concepts of IRR and NPV can be applied analogously to the measurement of fiscal returns. In each
period t, the fiscal surplus Si,t that is generated by individual i is defined as the difference between
public revenue and public expenditures with regard to that individual. We restrict the measure
to budgetary components that can be expected to deviate strongly between individuals of different
educational degrees and that can be simulated within our model framework.14
14For instance, fully capturing the fiscal effects of higher education on the social security system would imply modeling
outcomes like health and life expectancy as well, which is beyond the scope of this paper. See Eide and Showalter (2011)
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The fiscal surplus is defined as
Si,t = taxesi,t + ssci,t − benefitsi,t − 0.5τi,t(transfershh,t) − pubexpi,t, (6)
with τ = 1 if individual i is married and τ = 2 if unmarried, taxes comprising income, capital with-
holding and value added taxes, ssc overall (employer’s and employee’s) social security contributions,
benefits unemployment and parental leave benefits, transfers social transfers like social assistance,
housing allowance and BAföG payments, and pubexp public expenditures for education as well as
other public expenditures. Importantly, employing the same argumentation as for private returns, we
refrain from including the public pension system in the fiscal surplus measure.
When computing the fiscal surplus generated by higher educated individuals, we take into account
the financing of health care expenditures. In Germany, dependent employees are typically insured
under the statutory health insurance scheme. However, a non-negligible fraction of individuals are
privately insured, in particular civil servants, the self-employed, and dependent employees with rela-
tively high labor incomes. Therefore, within our simulation framework, the effect of higher education
on the balance of public health insurance is twofold: it consists, first, of the effect on the probability to
be insured under the public health insurance scheme and, second, conditional on being insured under
the public health insurance scheme, of the effect on the level of contributions paid.
Estimating fiscal returns, one group that deserves special attention are civil servants and public
employees. Civil servants are typically privately health insured in Germany, with premiums being
subsidized by the state (Beihilfe). Moreover, in theory the fiscal return generated by higher educated
civil servants and public employees would have to account for the effect on remuneration and the
marginal revenue product of labor of these employees as well. To make things easier, throughout the
simulation we assume the number, qualification, and remuneration of the publicly employed to be
fixed. We exclude life cycles of civil servants from the computation of fiscal returns and treat life
cycles of other public employees as if they were working in the private sector.
The fiscal IRR is then defined as the interest rate at which the present values of the average fiscal










for an overview of potential education-level related differences in health and life expectancy.
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Finally, the fiscal NPV of higher education is defined as:
NPV fiscali = LTS
HE
i − LTSV OCi , (8)


















g,t is the period t average surplus of group g that individual i belongs to, defined by migration
background and gender. Hence, at a given interest rate r, the NPV is positive if the benefits of
investing in higher education — higher tax revenues and social security contributions due to higher
labor earnings and lower transfers due to less and shorter phases of unemployment — outweigh the
costs of higher public expenditures and a delayed labor market entry.
Similar to other studies that estimate the fiscal returns to education, we do not take into account
human capital externalities which might be an indirect channel through which educational investment
impacts the public budget. Using a similar computational measure, de La Fuente and Jimeno (2009)
therefore interpret their fiscal return estimate to be a lower bound of the true return. However, the
literature has come to very ambiguous results as to whether these externalities are sizeable (see, for
instance, Acemoglu and Angrist, 2000; Moretti, 2004; Ciccone and Peri, 2006). Also, we abstract from
general-equilibrium effects of a potential increase in higher educational attainment on the (distribution
of) marginal returns to higher education.
4 Dynamic Microsimulation Model
4.1 Projecting the lives of a young cohort
A number of studies have used projection techniques to forecast life cycles. Often, these studies aim
at providing information on trends of socio-economic development under current versus alternative
policies, or at evaluating the future performance of pension, health and long-term care systems, given
economic and demographic trends (Li and O’Donoghue, 2013). For Germany, for instance, different
life cycle models and projection techniques have been used to study future public pension entitlements
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of specific birth cohorts (Geyer and Steiner, 2014), to evaluate the lifetime monetary values of family
policy measures (Bonin et al., 2016), to study inequality in lifetime income across cohorts (Bönke et al.,
2020), and to assess how the tax-transfer system reduces the inequality in lifetime income (Haan et al.,
2017).
In the literature on returns to education, different methodological approaches have been applied
to generate artificial life cycles. The OECD, for instance, regularly provides estimates on the returns
to education across countries using the so-called short-cut method (OECD, 2019). Here, employment
biographies are constructed by averaging earnings of all individuals given a certain age, gender and
education level. Another approach, often called “splicing”, consists in drawing observations from a
cross-section of individuals, conditional on age, education, and other characteristics, and stitching
them together to form full life cycles. Applications of this method range from randomly drawing
based on a small subset of variables only (Pfeiffer and Stichnoth, 2019, 2020) to versions based on
elaborate matching approaches (Levell and Shaw, 2015). Compared to the simple OECD approach,
the former variant has the advantage that the precision of these estimates can be assessed by looking
at the distribution of generated life cycles and returns, while the latter more accurately reflects actual
life cycles.
The approach we follow relies on dynamic microsimulation, that is, modeling the transition pro-
cesses between different states and then simulating life cycles of individuals with different initial values.
Dynamic microsimulation has the advantage of capturing path dependencies which are key to simulat-
ing heterogeneous life cycles and to analyze heterogeneous returns to higher education. Furthermore,
microsimulation models are able to capture observable differences across cohorts.15 Yet, there are, to
our knowledge, only two studies for France that use dynamic microsimulation models to estimate the
returns to education: Courtioux et al. (2014) model earnings, employment, and mortality to estimate
the distribution of returns to higher education for different educational degrees in France. Courtioux
and Lignon (2016) add a simulation module for household formation to disentangle (direct) labor
market returns and (indirect) marriage market returns.
4.2 Model overview and data
In our model, we simulate biographies on a yearly basis from age 18 until the supposed retirement at age
67 (the status quo legal retirement age for the chosen cohort).16 For the simulation, we take as given
15In contrast, dynamic microsimulation has its own drawbacks such as high data requirements, the complexity of
modeling and a high computational burden.
16Since we simulate the trajectories of a distinct cohort over a relatively long time period, our model belongs to the
class of “cohort models” as opposed to “population models”, that model a population cross-section over a defined period
of time (see Li and O’Donoghue, 2013).
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the distribution of highest educational degrees of the 1983–88 birth cohort by gender and migration
background, as presented in Figure 1.17 Even though our focus is the comparison of life cycles under
higher education and vocational training, given a higher education entrance degree (HEED), we also
simulate the life courses of individuals with either of the two other educational outcomes presented in
Figure 1: vocational degree without a HEED and no post-secondary degree at all. The reason is that
these individuals serve as potential spouses for the individuals of the first two educational categories.
Our model proceeds in three stages: estimation, life cycle simulation, and tax-transfer simulation.
We provide a brief overview of these stages first and present the details of each part thereafter.
Estimation We estimate transition probabilities regarding family formation and employment out-
comes, aggregate cohort-specific targets for the respective states, and hourly wage regressions.
Life-cycle simulation In the simulation stage we sequentially simulate the cohort’s life cycles
based on the estimated parameters and using alignment methods. Figure 2 provides a graphical
representation of the main processes. Model projections are based on dynamic ageing, implying a
recursive process in which the individual age is updated and the trajectories in terms of several key
variables are simulated year after year. This process is repeated until individuals reach the age of 67.18
We also add an alignment (calibration) module to each transition process. This ensures that aggregate
outcomes are kept in line with projected macro developments. Yet, we abstract from potential general
equilibrium effects of changes in household formation and employment patterns and hold the estimated
parameter values of our transition models constant throughout the simulation process, as is common
in the dynamic microsimulation literature (Li and O’Donoghue, 2013). After having simulated the life
cycles, we predict gross labor incomes conditional on education, simulated labor market experience
and other covariates.
Tax-transfer simulation In the last stage, the resulting taxes, transfers, and social security con-
tributions and finally disposable incomes are simulated using a trimmed version of the Tax-Benefit
Microsimulation Model (STSM, see Steiner et al., 2012). Instead of applying the actual tax-transfer
regulations experienced by the 1980s cohort, we use the rules of 2019 uniformly for all simulated age
years. The reason is that we aim at forecasting the life cycle of a young cohort under the current
tax-transfer regulations where the life cycles of the 1980s cohort serve as a benchmark. Further details
on the simulation of taxes and transfers can be found in Section A.1 in the Appendix.
17In Figure 1 the distribution is not conditioned on migration background.
18Naturally, after the age of 45 fertility is virtually zero. Nevertheless, the process is technically simulated until the
age of 67.
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Figure 2: The simulation stage
Fertility Marriage, matching
EmploymentDivorce






Our main database is the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). The SOEP is an annual, na-
tionally representative longitudinal study of private households across Germany, with currently more
than 30,000 individuals (Goebel et al., 2018). The SOEP data provides information on all house-
hold members, on topics such as household composition, occupational biographies, employment, and
earnings. The laws of motion for household formation and employment and the wage regressions are
estimated using the SOEP waves of the years 1984–2018 and individuals aged 18 to 66. We exclude
individuals with missing or inconsistent information on their education levels and the refugee samples
of the SOEP. For the alignment modules we additionally use official statistics of the Federal Statistical
Office, which are based on administrative and census data.19
The next section describes the main components of our model in more detail.
4.3 Transition modules
We estimate discrete-choice models for household formation and employment transitions and linear
regressions for wages. To capture differences in these processes across educational paths, discrete-
choice models include education and training indicators as covariates and wage models are estimated
separately by degree. In all transition models, we include year and birth cohort dummies, where a
cohort spans ten years. Also, we control for living in the states of the former East Germany. All
models are estimated separately by gender. For some categorical variables we include an orthogo-
nalized transformation. This has the advantage that, while we can control for these variables in the
19While target estimation for employment states relies on SOEP data, marriage, divorce, and fertility targets use dif-
ferent data sources: Statistisches Bundesamt (2019b,c) for fertility, Statistisches Bundesamt (2004–2017a) for marriages,
and Statistisches Bundesamt (2004–2017b) for divorces. The decision to base target estimation partly on aggregated
data instead of SOEP micro data is motivated by the attempt to account for cohort differences in life cycle patterns,
which is difficult with micro data for relatively rare events such as fertility, marriage and divorce.
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estimations, they do not have to be simulated in the simulation stage of the model. Instead, the
average effect over all categories is applied when simulating outcomes. In general, all estimations rely
on a selection-on-observables assumption. Estimation results of the transition models are displayed in
the Appendix.
4.3.1 Marriage and divorce
We model the probability of marrying as a function of age polynomials, educational training indicators,
lagged births and child indicators, lagged employment indicators, accumulated years of unemployment,
previous divorces, and migration background (for the detailed specification and estimated coefficients,
see Table A1). Our microsimulation model also includes a matching process which allows to match
women and men that were selected for a marriage. We do this by separating the pool of individuals
that were simulated to marry into two groups: one group within which there is perfect educational
assortative mating, i.e. highly educated men marry highly educated women, while low educated men
marry low educated women. And another group, within which there is no assortative mating, i.e.
men and women are randomly matched. The share of the respective groups is calibrated to match the
empirically observed pattern as closely as possible.
As to divorce, we estimate a logit model for women only. We model the probability to divorce as
a function of couple characteristics such as the age difference between the spouses, the time married,
an indicator for having married before the age of thirty, the presence of children in the household,
the employment states of the spouses, experience of previous divorces, and migration background (see
Table A2 for the specification and estimated coefficients).
4.3.2 Fertility
In our fertility module, we estimate logit models for the probability of giving birth to a child, separately
by marital status. For both married and unmarried women, this probability is modeled as a function of
age, training indicators, the presence of children already living in the household, tenure, and migration
background. The model for married women also includes years married and the lagged employment
status (see Table A3 for the estimated coefficients).
4.3.3 Employment
We model employment as a three-step process, consisting of labor force participation, involuntary un-
employment and working time estimations. In what follows we set out the general modeling approach.
For the exact specification of the estimated models and coefficient estimates, see Tables A4–A7 in the
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Appendix.
First, we describe labor force participation as a binary choice model that depends on lagged labor
force participation, age, education levels, interactions thereof, and migration background. In addition,
we allow women’s labor force participation to depend on marriage status and on having given birth
in previous periods while for men we include the presence of children in the household. We model
the particularities of the entry into the labor market by modeling separate transition models for each
of the first five years after graduation (estimation results not shown). Second, conditional on labor
force participation, we model the probability to be involuntarily unemployed. We define involuntary
unemployment as being without work but having actively searched for a new position within four
weeks at the time of the survey and being able to start working within the following two weeks.
The set of covariates is similar to above, additionally including cumulated years of employment and
unemployment. Third, conditional on labor force participation and employment, each individual is
modeled to be in one of several possible employment states, characterized by a discrete set of working
hours. Hours classifications are based on the empirical distribution observed in the SOEP. For women,
we model five employment states: Marginal employment (0–14 hours), reduced part-time work (15–24
hours), extended part-time (25–34 hours), full-time work (35–42 hours), and over-time (more than 42
hours). For men, we model three employment states: Part-time (0–34 hours), full-time (35–42 hours),
and over-time work (more than 42 hours). We estimate multinomial logit models that, compared to the
above employment-related model specifications, additionally control for tenure and self-employment.
4.3.4 Wages
Since, clearly, a strong link between hourly wage premiums to higher education and the full (private
and fiscal) return to higher education exists, appropriate modeling of wages is key to our simulation
analysis. In the baseline specification, we regress individual log gross hourly wages on fourth-order
polynomials of age, experience, and tenure, and on indicators for industry sector, for being self-
employed or a civil servant, migration background, and orthogonalized indicators for federal states.20
Moreover, we include year-specific dummy variables to control for changes in macroeconomic factors
(e.g., business cycles) in a flexible way. Estimation is conducted separately by gender and educational
category. In an alternative specification we also include birth cohort dummies where birth cohorts
span 20 years. Clearly, in a regression that includes age and year effects, cohort effects cannot be
identified without relying on further assumptions.21 Here, we follow the approach in Deaton (1997),
20We consider real wages with 2019 as the base year.
21When cohort measures are defined as dummy variables for several births years, identification of age, year and cohort
effects is in principle possible through the variation in age within each year-cohort group.
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which assumes that year effects are orthogonal to a linear trend and add up to zero over the observation
period. In this setting, the year effects only capture cyclical movements around this trend.
By estimating wage regressions separately by education we do not rely on the assumption that
education and experience are separable as in the original Mincer equation, which is, as argued above, a
problematic assumption (see Bhuller et al., 2017). While empirical studies on the returns to education
often refrain from questioning the validity of the assumptions implicit in estimating Mincer-type
equations which are necessary to infer internal rates of return to education, a potential endogeneity
bias in the estimated schooling coefficient is one of the most discussed topics in labor economics
(Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2018). When reliable instruments are absent, unbiased estimation of the
wage equation rests on a selection-on-observables assumption, i.e. the assumption that conditional on
the other explanatory variables included in the wage regression, the level of schooling is not correlated
with the error term, which might include variables like ability or motivation. We do not consider
an Instrumental Variables (IV) strategy since there is no suitable instrument that predicts higher
education attainment available in our data.22 Moreover, it is unclear in which direction IV estimates
would differ from OLS. For instance, Bhuller et al. (2017) find larger IRR estimates from IV than
from OLS. Furthermore, they show that the biases arising from violations of the other key IRR
assumptions (see Section 1) are empirically more important than the selection bias arising in OLS
estimates. Finally, we alleviate the potential impact of an ability bias on our estimates by restricting
our counterfactual group to those who have obtained a HEED. As the German education system is
essentially tracking students according to their ability, we expect these individuals to be more similar
to the group of academics than individuals without HEED.2324 The estimation results are displayed
in Tables A8–A10 in the Appendix.
4.4 Alignment
We include an alignment module in our model as a tool for calibrating the model output, as is
common in the dynamic microsimulation literature (see Li and O’Donoghue, 2014, for an overview
of alignment methods). Alignment ensures that the results of our micro models are, on average,
in line with aggregate generational trends. In addition, it allows us to incorporate accurate macro-
level statistics of births, marriages, and divorces into our microsimulation model. The goal of the
22Kamhöfer et al. (2018), for instance, exploit college openings for their IV strategy. These openings, however, took
place in the period 1958-1990 and hence only affected older cohorts than the one we are interested in.
23See Walker and Zhu (2011) and Glocker and Storck (2014) for a similar approach.
24Another potential empirical problem could be non-random selection into the labor force. However, previous studies
that also estimate returns to education such as Glocker and Storck (2014) and Steiner and Lauer (2000) have found that
applying Heckman corrections with different sets of exclusion restrictions yielded only minor changes in the estimated
education coefficients.
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alignment module is to predict age-specific targets for our cohort of interest such as the proportion of
men/women marrying or being in the labor force at each age of the life cycle. While the targets of
these variables are proportions between zero and one, using linear regression models would not restrict
predicted target values to the unit interval. Therefore, we estimate fractional logit models to estimate
our targets by quasi maximum likelihood. In fractional logit models, the conditional expectation of
the dependent variable is modeled as a logistic function, just as in the binary logit model (see Papke
and Wooldridge, 1996, 2008). Similarly, the proportions of each of the working hours categories,
dependent on employment, are estimated using fractional multinomial logit models. This ensures that
the predicted shares add up to unity.25
For each of the estimated target models, the dependent variable is defined on a cell level as
the respective proportion by birth year, age and gender.26 As explanatory variables we include age
polynomials and either generational trend polynomials (generational trend defined as birth year−1930)
or birth year cohort dummies (grouped over ten-year intervals), as well as the overall unemployment
rate. See Tables A12–A14 for estimation results including the full list of independent variables.
We predict target rates for each simulated age year of the 1980s cohort, based on the estimated
parameters.27 The projected targets are graphed in the Appendix in Figures A1–A3, together with
observed patterns for the 1980s and older cohorts. Plotting predicted against observed life-cycle
patterns is useful in two dimensions: first, it allows to investigate trends in household formation
and employment patterns over past cohorts, and second, it enables us to check the reliability of our
out-of-sample predictions. Again, data availability determines which segments of the life cycle are
observed for a particular cohort. While for some transitions and states, trends in life-cycle patterns
across cohorts appear to be rather negligible (e.g. the marriage rate of women), for others they are
more noticeable. This especially holds for birth rates and labor force participation, but also for some
working hours categories. Regarding women’s working lives, the model captures the increases in the
participation rate and in extended part-time employment over cohorts. Moreover, for men our model
predicts a higher participation rate at older ages compared to previous cohorts, including a more
prominent role of part-time work.28
25See Ramalho et al. (2011) for an overview of estimation strategies for fractional regression models and Mullahy
(2015) for a discussion of the extension of these models to multivariate fractional data.
26The number of cells used for the estimation of the target models is restricted by data availability and differs over
the targets. For instance, regarding births, for each birth year cohort between 1930 and 1967 there are 35 data points
available for the age years between 15 and 49. For birth year cohorts from 1968 to 1999, only n = 35− (birthyear−1967)
data cells are available. In total, this results in 1,573 cells. While employment-specific target estimations are based on
a similar number of cells, the target estimation for marriages and divorces relies on a lower cell number. Note that the
proportion of individuals divorcing is only available in 5-year age intervals.
27For the predictions we assume an aggregate unemployment rate of 6%, which is the average unemployment rate
over the last ten years and hence seems a plausible assumption for the life cycle of the young cohort.
28Note that for men we define weekly working hours of up to 34 hours as part-time work.
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4.5 Simulation
In order to simulate family formation, family dissolution, and employment transitions, we follow an
approach similar to Courtioux and Lignon (2016). In what follows, we provide an overview of how
we simulate life cycles. A description of further modeling details and assumptions can be found in in
Section A.1 of the Appendix.
Given the empirical distribution of gender, education, and migration background for the 1980s
cohort, we simulate the life cycles of 5,000 artificial individuals from age 18 to 66. Individuals enter
the labor market after their training phases, which we assume to be six years for academic training and
three years for vocational training. The model implicitly captures the phenomenon of early retirement
as some individuals might be simulated to leave the labor force before the age of 66. Potential pension
payments, however, are not accounted for.
The procedure to select individuals for transitions works as follows:
1. Predict individual transition probabilities using the parameter estimates from the transition
models.
2. Multiply each probability with a random draw from the unit interval.
3. Rank individuals according to these modified probabilities.
4. Based on this ranking, select individuals for transitions until the respective aggregate target
rates are met.
This procedure is repeated for every transition process and each age, from 18 to 66.29 It guarantees that
the simulation reflects individual (education level)-specific differences in the transition probabilities
(step 1) and additional variability that is not captured by our models (step 2). Aggregate shares are
aligned to our estimated cohort-specific targets, which assures that we capture generational trends in
household formation and employment behavior (steps 3 and 4).30
Having simulated the transitions in employment allows us simulate earnings over the life course.
First, we predict log gross hourly wages for all ages given exogenous and simulated variables. To
this prediction we add random draws from the distribution of the log wage residuals, conditional on
gender, education, and self-employment status.31 This procedure aligns the variance of simulated
29The algorithm is very similar to what has been called the SBD approach in Li and O’Donoghue (2014).
30For some employment states, measured persistence was very high for simulated life cycles compared to observed
ones. Therefore, a calibrated share of individuals are selected randomly for transitions into those states. Specifically, this
holds for 30 percent of the transitions into unemployment, and for 15 percent of the transitions into the three part-time
employment states of women.
31We condition on self-employment status because we observe a higher variance in wages for the group of self-employed,
compared to dependent employees.
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wages to the variance of observed wages. Finally, to obtain hourly wages in levels, the resulting sum
is exponentiated.32 To compute labor earnings, hourly wages are multiplied by the observed average
level of working hours given the simulated employment category.
5 Validation
Due to their complex model structure, dynamic microsimulation models are often regarded as a black
box (see, e.g., Dekkers, 2016; Lütz and Stein, 2020). From the estimation results of the transition
models one cannot infer whether the models perform well in terms of simulated life-cycle profiles.
Therefore, we provide evidence on the predictive performance of our dynamic modeling approach by
contrasting simulated and observed life-cycle patterns. Since life cycles of our simulated cohort are
only observable up to their mid-thirties, older cohorts and results of previous simulation studies serve
as a benchmark.
5.1 Autocorrelations
First, we check whether the level of persistence in household composition and employment outcomes in
our simulated sample is plausible. We do this by showing autocorrelations of simulated and observed
outcomes as well as average durations in different employment states. For observed outcomes, we pool
all cohorts from 1950 to 1980.
Figures A4 and A5 depict simulated autocorrelations in employment and family formation out-
comes for women and men, respectively. They are contrasted with the levels of autocorrelation ob-
served in the SOEP data. The following findings indicate that the microsimulation model performs
reasonably well in predicting life cycles of our target cohort. First, autocorrelations for both observed
and simulated states are generally increasing in age, with exceptions at age years with major changes
in the labor force participation taking place. For example, for women observed employment persis-
tence decreases at age years with high birth rates. Moreover, autocorrelations shrink for our simulated
cohort when university graduates enter the labor market.33 Second, autocorrelations for the simulated
trajectories are highest between the ages of fifty and sixty, which is in line with observed patterns.
This holds particularly for higher-order autocorrelations.34 Regarding employment, our model pre-





where x is a vector of covariates, β̂ a vector of the estimated coefficients and û is the randomly assigned residual from
the log wage regression.
33Due to the simplifying assumption regarding the duration of educational programs, which results in all persons with
a particular schooling degree entering labor market at the same age, former (full-time) employees are partly crowded
out. This should be of no major concern regarding the validity of the estimated financial gain of higher education, since
primarily individuals with no or low vocational degrees are affected.
34A notable exception is the autocorrelation in the (un)employment state of men. While the pattern of short-term
autocorrelation is similar for simulated and observed life cycles, simulated longer-term persistence is shrinking between
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dicts a falling level of persistence thereafter, which is rooted in the raising share of persons switching
to part-time employment or leaving the labor force.
Finally, we measure persistence by the average length of spells, which is included in Tables A15 and
A16.35 Our simulated data reflect the observation that persistence in unemployment is relatively low,
while persistence in marriage and parent status is relatively high, compared to the other labor market
states shown. For example, the average unemployment spell is about two years in our simulation, while
the average marriage spell comprises about 25 years.36 The fact that the model considerably over-
predicts persistence in the marriage status of men (see Figure A5) is partly rooted in the distribution
of marriages being based on the marriage pattern of women, which is due to the closed character of
our cohort model.
5.2 Differences by education
As the focus of this study is on the financial gain of higher education degrees, it is essential that the
microsimulation model succeeds in replicating differences in life cycles across educational groups.37
Sequence analysis helps to visualize transition patterns and how they compare across distinct popula-
tion groups (Abbott, 1995). For a graphical representation of how employment and family formation
trajectories differ between education levels, we depict sequence index plots of 400 randomly drawn
male and female life cycles.38 Moreover, we provide descriptive statistics on the distribution and
length of spells across educational groups. Finally, we describe how simulated gross hourly wages and
labor earnings evolve over the life cycle.
ages forty and fifty whereas observed persistence increases.
35Note that, since our simulation stops at age 66, the last spell of each individual is right-censored. By including
these spells, we generally underestimate the spell lengths.
36The average duration in unemployment is high compared to the average duration of completed spells reported by
the German Federal Employment Agency, which is about 8.5 months (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2019). Measuring only
registered unemployment, this number is not fully comparable to our estimate, however. Moreover, note that while the
unit of time in our model is years, we set unemployment spells of one period to three months, as described in Section A.1,
resulting in a median unemployment spell of three months in our simulation. Also, classification as being unemployed
is based on the labor market state at the time of the interview. For instance, an individual might be unemployed in the
month of the interview, then employed for eleven months, and then unemployed again in the month of the interview of
the following year, leading to be classified as unemployed for two consecutive years. This leads to an over-prediction of
persistence in unemployment.
37Recall that while aggregate employment and family formation patterns are set by the estimated targets, differences
in transitions between education levels exclusively stem from the estimated transition models.
38Sequence index plots graph sequences as horizontal lines and sort these sequences according to a matching algorithm.
To sort sequences, we apply the Needleman-Wunsch optimal matching algorithm and use the Levenshtein distance
measure for evaluating the distance between two sequences. See Scherer (2001), who proposed sequence index plots
as a tool to investigate early career patterns. The number of 400 life cycles considers the trade-off between having a
representative sample and readable figures.
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Employment
We start by validating simulated employment careers. Figure A6 depicts a sequence analysis for
employment transitions. Additionally, Table A15 lists average years spent in labor market states
over the life cycle across education groups and gender. In general, men’s employment biographies
are much more homogeneous than those of women. The majority of male paths are characterized by
more or less permanent full-time episodes in the middle of their careers, with only short interruptions
by part-time work or unemployment. On the contrary, frequent changes between employment states
can be observed in the career paths of women. As expected, post-education labor market attachment
increases with education. The share of men not working at young ages decreases with education. This
divergence is less pronounced at the end of the employment biographies, but still existent. Women’s
careers, on the other hand, are characterized by more (often birth-related) employment breaks in the
middle of their working lives. Long episodes characterized by near-permanent absence from the labor
market are however strongly concentrated at women without any post-secondary degree. Life cycles
with a high attachment to part-time employment are most common for women without a HEED but
with a vocational degree. Very often these episodes start with the birth of the first child and continue
until the exit from the labor market at older ages. Prevalence and length of such episodes decrease
with further educational attainment. Interestingly, for higher educated women, episodes of part-time
employment are less frequent compared to those with a vocational degree, while for men this pattern
cannot be observed. In sum, these findings result in the number of working hours increasing with
education.
The findings generally reflect what has been found in Geyer and Steiner (2014), who forecast
employment biographies of a German cohort that is slightly older than the one studied here.39 For
men our number of simulated years of full-time employment by education is very similar compared to
their study (for instance, for individuals with higher education, 32.5 years in our study and 32.2 (31.3)
in Geyer and Steiner (2014) for West (East) Germany). At the same time, years in unemployment are
lower in our study (1.7 vs. 2.0 (5.2)). For women, we generally simulate a higher attachment to the
labor market and a higher share of part-time employed women, particularly for the middle to lower
educated. For example, our model simulates 37.1 years of labor market participation for low educated
women, compared to 27 (44) years for West (East) Germany in Geyer and Steiner (2014). This should
be rooted in the generational trends of female labor market behavior predicted by our model.
39The authors show cumulated years for the 1967–71 cohort, separately for East and West Germany and do not
estimate years in part-time employment for men. Importantly, their education classification differs from ours, which
further complicates a comparison of the findings. Moreover, their simulation stops at the age of 65, while our simulation
ends two years later in life, reflecting the rise in the statutory retirement age.
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Family formation
Regarding transitions in family status, sequence analysis (see Figure A7) and descriptive statistics in
Tables A16, A17, and A18 reveal the following patterns: In general, life cycles can be categorized into
four major groups. The first group consists of individuals who never marry nor become parents. The
second group comprises individuals who become parents and get married consecutively within one or
two years and stay married thereafter, as well as parents that never marry. Heterogeneous life cycles
with one or more divorces form the third group. Finally, a small group of individuals marry (often
at higher ages) without becoming parents. The overall fertility rate is projected to be 1.69, which is
in line with the “optimistic” G3 assumption in the current coordinated population projection of the
German Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2019a). In general, our model replicates
the distribution of the number of births per woman correctly when compared to the distribution
observed for women of the 1970s cohort in the SOEP. Women’s age at first birth and age at first
marriage are considerably higher compared to older cohorts, as expected.40 The average duration of a
marriage at the time of divorce is about 8.5 years in our simulation, which is considerably lower than
what is reported in current cross-sectional administrative statistics, which is not surprising due to our
simulations terminating at the age of 66.41
For women, age at first birth, age at first marriage, and age at first divorce increase with education.
Moreover, the average number of marriages and births decreases with education and the shares of
women who have zero marriages and zero births are highest among those with an academic degree.
The pattern of childlessness is comparable to what Kreyenfeld and Konietzka (2017) and Bujard
(2015) have observed for a slightly older German cohort of women, using German microcensus data.
Interestingly, Kreyenfeld and Konietzka additionally show for this cohort that childlessness is largely
related to whether a woman obtained an HEED or not, while the decision whether to pursue higher
education is less relevant, which is also in line with our simulation results.
For men, we do not observe such linear relationships across education groups in the simulated
life cycles. For instance, the share of men who never marry turns out to be inverse U-shaped in our
simulations, which is not in line with what has been observed for older cohorts.42
40For instance, Frick et al. (2012) report 23.6–25.3 (22.6–24.6) as the range of mother’s age at first birth (marriage)
for the 1926–1965 birth cohorts, following a U-shaped pattern across cohorts.
41Statistisches Bundesamt (2004–2017b) reports an average duration of 15.0 marriage years for divorces in 2016.
42In particular, the average number of marriages is predicted to be highest for men without any post-secondary
degree. This is partially driven by men with migration background who have a higher propensity to marry and are
over-proportionally represented in the group of men without post-secondary degree.
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Hourly wages and yearly earnings
Figures A11 and A12 in the Appendix show the evolution of the simulated hourly wages and yearly
labor earnings in prices of 2019 over the life cycle, for specifications with and without estimation of
birth cohort effects (cohort groups being defined in intervals of twenty years). On several dimensions,
the simulated wage profiles are as expected. First, there is a clear ranking in terms of educational
degrees. Academics have higher wages than individuals with a vocational degree over most parts
of the life cycle. Second, wages are concave in age. Importantly, age–wage profiles not only differ
between men and women but also between educational degrees. By construction, simulated age–
earnings profiles show similar patterns as age–wage profiles. However, the decrease in earnings at the
end of the employment career is more notable than for hourly wages. This is a consequence of the
sharp reduction in working hours at these ages.
While the specifications with and without cohort effects deliver similar profiles for individuals with
vocational degrees, there are larger differences for academics. For both men and women, wages and
earnings are higher in the specification without cohort effects, yet this difference is stronger for women.
We assess the plausibility of these simulated profiles by comparing observed hourly wages of different
cohorts to simulated ones. Figure A13 in the Appendix shows this comparison for the specification
without cohort effects. Simulated wages appear to approximate well wage profiles of recent cohorts.
In contrast, for the specification with cohort effects (comparison with observed wages not shown),
simulated wages appear rather low, particularly for academic women. Therefore, we use the wage
specification without cohort effects as our preferred specification when analyzing the returns to higher
education.
6 Simulation results
As discussed in Section 3.1, we use two measures to assess the returns to education: the IRR for an
average employment biography and the NPV for the distribution of returns. Note that, importantly,
the comparison group (i.e., the counterfactual) of an individual with a higher education degree is
defined by the group of individuals who have a higher education entrance and a vocational training
degree and are of the same gender and migration background. All results shown are obtained over
100 simulation runs and monetary values are in 2019 prices.
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Table 1: Internal rates of return
Men Women
Gross return
No pooling 11.5 13.4
(1.0) (0.8)
Full pooling 9.9 11.8
(0.9) (0.8)
Net return
No pooling 8.7 9.7
(0.7) (0.5)
Full pooling 7.1 8.1
(0.7) (0.5)
Notes: Internal rates of return computed for average biographies. No
pooling = no income pooling within households. Full pooling = complete
income pooling within households. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Source: Own calculations.
6.1 Private returns to higher education
Table 1 shows the estimated private IRR for an average life cycle. We provide results for different
income concepts. First, to analyze the effect of the tax-transfer system on returns, we distinguish
between returns based on gross versus net income. And second, we contrast the scenario of no income
pooling of partners against the situation where all couples fully pool their income.43
Assuming no income pooling within households, we find a gross return of 11.5% for men and 13.4%
for women. The higher returns for women compared to men are partially rooted in the hourly wage
premium for academics which is larger for women. Under full income pooling, this return is reduced by
about one and a half percentage points, to 9.9% for men and 11.8% for women. Intuitively, the returns
to higher education under full income pooling means comparing the household incomes of academics
with those of individuals with vocational degrees. The effect of income pooling on the estimated returns
then crucially depends on the degree of assortative mating. If mating was completely random, the
partner’s income would be, on average, the same under all education levels. This would imply that an
individual with a higher education degree would pool her income with the same partner income as an
individual with a vocational degree, thereby mitigating the income advantage from higher education.
Hence, we would expect that income pooling shrinks the returns to higher education under completely
random mating. With some degree of assortative mating, however, higher educated individuals tend
to have better educated spouses with higher earnings. Therefore, a larger degree of assortative mating
compensates the negative effect of income pooling on the returns to a certain extent.
43We only present the returns under no and full income pooling as their returns are already close to each other.
Furthermore, household surveys such as the EU-SILC suggest that a sizeable share of households falls into either of the
two extremes (Ponthieux, 2017).
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Table 2: Private NPVs, men
Mean Median Share NPV< 0
1,000 Euros %
Gross income
No pooling 311.4 241.0 33.9
(35.7) (37.2) (2.7)
Full pooling 221.3 152.5 36.8
(30.6) (31.3) (2.8)
Net income
No pooling 172.5 130.9 36.2
(22.2) (23.9) (2.6)
Full pooling 111.6 75.2 39.3
(18.3) (18.7) (2.8)
Notes: No/full income pooling refers to income pooling between spouses.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Discount rate of 2% applied. Source:
Own calculations.
Table 3: Private NPVs, women
Mean Median Share NPV< 0
1,000 Euros %
Gross income
No pooling 345.8 249.3 27.4
(25.1) (25.5) (2.3)
Full pooling 274.0 199.0 30.1
(22.7) (22.9) (2.1)
Net income
No pooling 183.0 127.8 30.8
(14.8) (15.4) (2.4)
Full pooling 133.5 89.7 35.1
(13.1) (13.4) (2.1)
Notes: No/full income pooling refers to income pooling between spouses.
Standard errors shown in parentheses. Discount rate of 2% applied. Source:
Own calculations.
Finally, the tax-and-transfer system reduces the returns to higher education further to 8.7 (7.1)%
for men and 9.7 (8.1)% for women under no income pooling (full income pooling). This shows that
the progressive elements of the tax-transfer system depress returns from education relatively strongly.
This effect can be explained by looking at the average life cycles of academics and individuals with
a vocational degree. While still in training, academics have, on average, an income disadvantage
compared to individuals with vocational degrees. This income disadvantage is dampened by the
progressive elements of the tax-transfer system. From graduation until retirement, however, the
income advantage is inverse and academics earn substantially more. Importantly, this second effect
dominates the first one and hence, the progressive elements reduce the returns to higher education.
In contrast to the IRR, the NPV can be computed for all simulated individuals. For this, we set
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Table 4: Lifetime income components, in thousand Euros
Women Men
VOC HE ∆ VOC HE ∆
(1) Labor Income 665 1005 341 1174 1480 307
(2) Capital Income 18 23 5 25 30 5
(3) Income Tax 91 209 118 224 337 113
(4) Contributions 80 110 29 116 130 14
(5) Benefits 8 7 -1 7 5 -2
(6) Transfers 51 36 -15 24 14 -10
(1)+(2)-(3)-(4)+(5)+(6)
LTI, net 570 753 183 889 1062 172
Notes: Numbers are discounted working-life averages of simulated income components in thousand Euros, differentiated
by gender and education group, with HE higher education and VOC vocational training, assuming a 2% discount rate
and no income pooling in married couple households. Contributions include both private health care and social security
contributions (SSC). LTI denotes lifetime income. Regarding SSC, an incidence of 50% is assumed. Source: Own
calculations.
the discount rate to be 2%, similar to the OECD in recent analyses (OECD, 2019). Tables 2 and 3
present statistics on the financial gain of attaining higher education for our four income concepts. In
general, the NPVs confirm the results from the IRR analysis. Assuming no income pooling, higher
education increases men’s gross lifetime earnings by 311,000 Euros, compared to 346,000 Euros for
women. If one assumes that households fully pool their income, however, the returns shrink to 221,000
(274,000) Euros for men (women). Naturally, the tax-and-transfer system further reduces the returns.
Under no income pooling, the NPV of a higher education degree is reduced to 173,000 (183,000) Euros
for men (women). Assuming full income pooling we estimate the returns to be 112,000 and 134,000
Euros, respectively. In Figure A9, we plot the median NPV against different discount rates. Net
NPVs are close to 250,000 Euros for a zero percent discount rate and then start converging to zero
above discount rates of about seven percent.
Table 4 breaks down the returns just discussed into different components. It shows averages of
income, taxes, social security contributions, benefits, and transfers by gender and education level.
The largest part of returns comes from earned labor income. The difference in lifetime labor earnings,
307,000 Euros for men and 341,000 Euros for women, form the major part of the gross, no-pooling
NPVs shown in Tables 2 and 3. In our model, returns due to higher capital income play a minor
role for the overall private NPVs, and are simply a second-round effect from saved labor earnings.44
The larger labor earnings under higher education result in more income taxes paid and, to a smaller
extent, in higher social security contributions. At the same time, higher education decreases transfers
and social security benefits received. Finally, the last line displays the increase in lifetime income
under higher education, which corresponds to the private net NPV (no income pooling), as displayed
44We abstract from potential heterogeneities in capital investment returns.
27
Figure 3: Distribution of private net present values (in Thousands of Euros)
(a) Gross income, men (b) Gross income, women
(c) Net income, men (d) Net income, women
Notes: For the graphs, we pool all individuals from all 100 simulation runs. No/full sharing refers to income shar-
ing/pooling between spouses. Source: Own simulations.
in Tables 2 and 3.
As argued above, the main advantage of using the NPV instead of the IRR measure is that
heterogeneous returns can be analyzed. Figure 3 plots the distribution of returns for our four different
income concepts.45 They show that there is substantial heterogeneity in individual returns. On the
one hand, a non-negligible fraction of individuals obtain a gross NPV larger than 1,000,000 Euros.
At the same time, there is also a substantial share of life cycles with negative NPVs. For instance,
assuming no income pooling and looking at gross incomes, we predict the share of negative NPVs to
be 33.9% for men and 27.4% for women (see last column of Tables 2 and 3). Interestingly, income
pooling compresses the distribution of returns, i.e. both strongly positive and strongly negative returns
become less frequent.
What explains the heterogeneity in returns? To shed light on this question, it is helpful to consider
45Here, we pool all individuals from all runs. Figure A8 in the Appendix shows the distribution for each run separately.
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Table 5: Life cycle characteristics by NPV deciles
NPV, gross LTI, gross Hours Wage Yrs married Births
Men
1st -628.6 629.7 31.4 13.8 15.9 0.7
2nd -339.3 872.4 32.4 18.6 19.7 0.8
3rd -146.7 1059.0 33.3 21.9 20.6 0.8
4th 15.5 1215.9 33.9 24.8 20.7 0.9
5th 166.5 1356.7 34.4 27.2 21.5 0.9
6th 318.3 1501.9 34.9 29.8 22.5 1.0
7th 483.7 1665.7 35.5 32.5 22.6 0.9
8th 684.6 1861.3 35.8 36.0 22.9 1.0
9th 956.8 2140.5 36.4 40.7 22.7 0.9
10th 1603.4 2796.0 37.3 51.9 22.4 1.0
Total 311.4 1509.9 34.5 29.7 21.1 0.9
Women
1st -323.8 373.3 19.6 12.9 21.2 2.0
2nd -148.7 534.0 22.4 16.4 20.7 1.9
3rd -27.3 652.9 23.9 18.8 19.9 1.8
4th 83.0 760.9 25.1 20.9 18.8 1.7
5th 192.7 870.2 26.2 23.0 17.9 1.6
6th 310.9 987.9 27.1 25.2 16.7 1.5
7th 444.4 1123.0 28.1 27.7 16.2 1.4
8th 609.7 1290.7 29.1 30.8 15.0 1.3
9th 854.0 1536.9 30.2 35.3 13.9 1.2
10th 1462.5 2153.6 31.7 47.0 12.2 1.1
Total 345.8 1028.3 26.3 25.8 17.2 1.6
Notes: NPV, LTI: Numbers are discounted working-life averages in thousand Euros, assuming a 2%
discount rate and no income pooling in married couple households. Hours are average weekly working
hours, Wage is the average gross hourly wage. Yrs married are average years married and Births is
the average number of births. Source: Own calculations.
“typical” biographies with respect to the variables simulated in our model. In particular, there are
patterns of household formation and employment that strongly correlate with the individual’s return
to higher education. Table 5 displays life cycle characteristics by NPV decile. For both men and
women, working hours and hourly wages are almost monotonically increasing across deciles. For years
married and births, however, the patterns differ by gender: For women, the higher the NPV decile,
the lower the number of years married and the lower the number of births. For men, in contrast, those
in higher deciles tend to be married longer and have fewer children, even though the absolute change
across deciles is not as strong as for women.
It is important to understand that the mechanisms of household formation and employment should
be seen as interdependent. In the simulation, marriage, divorce, fertility, and employment are sequen-
tially determined and hence impact each other. As a result of the estimated transition models, for
women being married and having children often goes along with working less, part-time and ultimately
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lower labor earnings. In contrast, for men being married and having children usually goes along with
increasing employment, often working full-time and higher labor earnings.
6.2 Fiscal returns to education
Table 6 displays our estimates for the fiscal returns to higher education. As explained above, we
exclude civil servants from the analysis of fiscal returns. Furthermore, we look at individual incomes,
i.e. assuming no income pooling within couples.46 We report the IRR for average life cycles as well as
the central parameters of the distribution of NPVs for a discount rate of 2%. We find an IRR of 8.4%
for men and 9.9% for women. In addition, we estimate the mean NPV to be about 143,000 Euros
for men and 156,000 Euros for women. Similar to private returns, median NPVs are considerably
lower, but still about 115,000 Euros. These finding suggest that, on average, sizable fiscal gains can
be expected from an individual participating in higher education at current interest rate levels.
Table 6: Fiscal returns to higher education
IRR
NPV
Mean Median Share < 0
% 1,000 Euros %
Men 8.4 142.6 115.1 35.8
(0.9) (19.1) (21.0) (2.7)
Women 9.9 155.7 111.6 30.7
(0.7) (14.8) (16.3) (2.5)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, obtained over 100 runs. For NPVs a
discount rate of 2% is applied. Source: Own calculations.
In Table 7 we display the components of the fiscal surplus generated by average life cycles, sep-
arately by educational degrees. Also, for each component, we show the difference between higher
education and vocational degrees. As for private returns, the difference in average surplus (shown in
the 4th and 7th column of the bottom line) yields the average NPV for men and women, respectively.
Revenue gains from higher income taxes (row 3) are the major driver of the fiscal returns to higher
education, in the case of women (men) accounting for about 59% (71%) of the revenue-generating
components.47 The difference between men and women can be explained by the average labor income
of men being considerably higher than that of women in combination with the progressive nature
of income taxation in Germany. Since the average social security contributions rate is constant for
46Again, we account for the effect of joint income taxation on individual tax burdens in married couples, as described
in detail in Section A.1 in the Appendix.
47These and all following shares can be obtained by dividing the respective monetary value of a component by the
sum of all revenue-generating ∆.
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Table 7: Lifetime fiscal surplus components
Women Men
VOC HE ∆ VOC HE ∆
(1) SSC employee 76 99 23 111 123 13
(2) SSC employer 63 75 12 101 102 1
(3) Income Tax 91 198 107 224 341 118
(4) VAT 65 84 19 106 127 21
(5) Benefits 8 7 -1 7 5 -2
(6) Transfers 51 37 -14 24 14 -10
(7) Relief public health care 2 4 2 2 4 2
(8) Educational expenses 14 37 24 14 37 24
(1)+(2)+(3)+(4)-(5)-(6)+(7)-(8)
LTS 223 379 156 499 642 143
Notes: Numbers are discounted working-life averages of simulated income components in thousand Euros, differentiated
by gender and education group, with HE higher education and VOC vocational training, assuming a 2% discount rate
and no income pooling in married couple households. SSC denote social security contributions (pension system excluded).
“Relief public health care” show public health care expenditures saved due to privately insured self-employed individuals.
Source: Own calculations.
middle incomes and decreasing for high incomes, SSC (rows 1-2) contribute considerably less to the
fiscal surplus components (19% and 8%) than income taxes. Also, as the share of privately health
insured individuals is larger among the higher educated individuals, the rise in contributions with
education is attenuated.48 The social security contributions ceiling is the reason why the role SSC
have for returns is less important for men than for women. As for value added taxes (row 4), we
find their share to be about 11% for women and 13% for men. Due to the proportional character of
the tax, the contributions to the overall fiscal surplus is limited. Lower transfers and benefits (rows
5-6) further increase the fiscal gains from higher education, while contributing no more than about
7–8% to the revenue generating components. In sum, the positive fiscal effects of taxes, SSC, and
reduced transfers clearly outweigh the higher educational expenses and the opportunity costs due to
academics’ delayed labor market entry.
However, at the same time we predict negative fiscal NPVs for a sizable share of the higher educated
individuals: slightly above (below) one third of the simulated life cycles of men (women) who pursue
higher education imply fiscal losses when compared to the average counterfactual life cycles (see Table
6). This finding is also observable in Figure 4, which plots the distribution of fiscal returns for women
and men. Again, both density functions are right-skewed, with women’s returns somewhat more
compressed.
48However, the self-employed who opt for the public health insurance scheme typically bear the full burden of con-
tributions. In Table 7, these contributions are comprised in the position “SSC employee”. Therefore, this position still
rises faster with education than “SSC employer” does.
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Figure 4: Distribution of the fiscal NPV of higher education
Notes: Density function of the fiscal NPV of higher education. A discount rate of 2 % is
applied. Source: Own simulations.
7 Discussion
As explained above, there are other studies quantifying the lifetime returns to higher education. In
general, it is difficult to compare our results to studies from other countries. One fundamental reason
is the definition of the counterfactual to higher education. While Germany has a well-established
system of vocational training which is a viable alternative for many young adults, this alternative
is missing in other countries. Hence, we compare our results to two studies which also estimate the
return to higher education for Germany, Pfeiffer and Stichnoth (2020) (henceforth PS) and OECD
(2019) (henceforth OECD). Table 8 compares our return estimates to the ones presented in these
studies. In sum, we find that our estimates for the private returns are similar to the ones in PS but
considerably lower than the ones presented by the OECD. In contrast, for fiscal returns our estimates
are larger than both OECD and PS, but closer to the ones reported in OECD.
Various reasons might be responsible for the differences found between our study and the others.
For instance, PS exclude civil servants and self-employed from their estimation while we include both
for private returns and only exclude civil servants for fiscal returns. In addition, PS assume that
tax-transfer components of household income are divided equally between both partners, which might
be a reason why they find lower fiscal returns (see the discussion above).
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Table 8: Returns to higher education across studies
Private
Fiscal





This study 11.5, 13.4 9.9, 11.8 8.7, 9.7 7.1, 8.1 8.4, 9.9
Pfeiffer and Stichnoth (2020) 14.2 x x 7.4 6.6
OECD (2019) x x 14, 16 x 6, 9
Notes: The table lists estimated IRRs to higher education for Germany (in %). When two numbers are shown,
the first refers to women and the second refers to men. When one single number is shown, the return estimates
for women and men are pooled. Income concepts for which no return estimates were computed are labeled with
“x”. Source: Own calculations, Pfeiffer and Stichnoth (2020), OECD (2019).
Net private returns to higher education estimated by the OECD appear surprisingly high. One
reason for this should be that the OECD uses another comparison group for the group of academics.
This comparison group is comprised of individuals with either higher education entrance degree or with
vocational training degree. Hence, this approach precisely excludes our comparison group, i.e. those
with both degrees. Another reason might be the modeling of the tax-and-transfer system. The OECD
uses a very simplified model for estimating taxes and transfers for each individual. Transfers and
benefits, for instance, are not simulated, which are more important for individuals with a vocational
degree than for academics. Lastly, changes in methodology across OECD publications that are difficult
to trace for the reader have produced substantial variation in results across recent publication years.
Finally, it should be noted that beyond the reasons mentioned above, there are fundamental
differences in the modeling approaches. While PS and OECD use one single or a few recent cross-
section(s), implicitly relying on the so-called synthetic cohort assumption, we account for time and
cohort effects. An example is female labor force participation where we see considerable changes across
birth cohorts.
One striking feature of our results is that the share of life cycles that yield negative private or
fiscal NPVs to higher education is relatively high, for instance when compared to the estimates of
Courtioux et al. (2014), who find an overall share of 3.5% negative private returns for France.49
Again, the sharp difference to their results can be explained for the most part by their definition of
the counterfactual income stream, which is based on all individuals without a higher education degree.
Following this approach in our model would result in shifting the distribution of NPVs to the right,
and decreasing the share of negative NPVs. However, as argued above, we think that our approach is
more appropriate to estimate returns to higher education for Germany. Nevertheless, one might still
49Note that Courtioux et al. (2014) base their measure of negative returns on individual IRRs instead of NPVs. Even
though the two measures are related, their results are not fully comparable.
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wonder whether the proportion of negative NPVs is plausible. Indeed, we argue that these results
have to be interpreted with some caution. First, our simulation strategy rests on the assumption
that the wage residuals we impute for each individual are the result of a matching process between
employee and employer. However, to some extent the empirical distribution of the wage residuals,
or, more specifically their variance, also reflects measurement error in hourly wages. In our data,
this can be expected in particular for hourly wages of self-employed individuals.50 The measurement
error in observed (log) hourly wages inflates the variance of residuals, and thereby the variance of
simulated wages and of estimated NPVs. This is also reflected in the very low hourly wage levels
we observe for the lowest NPV deciles (shown in Table 5). Second, we assume that all individuals,
conditional on gender and migration background, have the same counterfactual. This implies that
there is no correlation between the wage residuals drawn under higher education and those under
vocational training. Hence, an academic who “draws” a high residual has the same counterfactual as
an academic with a low residual. Assuming that there is some positive correlation between residuals
would compress the distribution and hence imply a lower share of negative NPVs. A similar argument
could be made about the correlation of economic sectors under both educational paths, for instance.
In general, however, it is difficult to argue how the “correct” counterfactual would look like.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we use a dynamic microsimulation model to estimate the lifetime returns to higher
education both for the individual and for the state. Going beyond most of the previous research, we
account for generational trends, explore the effect of income pooling, and analyze the distribution of
returns. At the individual level, we find private gross financial returns of 11.5% (13.4%) and fiscal
returns of about 8.4% (9.9%) for men (women). We show how the tax-and-transfer system and the
extent of income pooling within households shrink these returns. We find a large heterogeneity in
returns, which is rooted in different hourly wages, employment biographies and patterns of household
formation.
For a sizeable share of individuals we predict negative NPVs of an investment in higher education.
It is important to emphasize, however, that these individuals are not necessarily worse off in terms of
utility. The reason is that we do not take into account the non-monetary returns and costs of higher
education in an individual’s utility function. Several studies have investigated the effect of education
on outcomes such as mental and physical health (Kamhöfer et al., 2018; Heckman et al., 2018b,a). In
50In the SOEP questionnaire, they are asked to estimate the income in the month before the interview, which can be
expected to be fluctuating more sharply compared to dependent employees.
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addition, (higher) education also has a consumption value in that studying comes along with “psychic”
costs (or rewards) (Heckman et al., 2008) that differ among individuals. Moreover, many of the life
cycles that yield a negative return in our simulations are characterized by more part-time work than
the average life cycle under vocational training. Insofar as consumption and leisure time are normal
goods, utility losses through lower income are compensated by leisure time induced utility gains.
Furthermore, as more data that follows individuals over a large parts of their life cycle becomes
available, researchers will be able to compute cohorts’ life-cycle returns. This might lead some re-
searchers to assume that there is no need for simulating artificial life cycles. However, it should be
clear that, by nature, fully observable life cycles imply an ex-post perspective: The returns are com-
puted for older, already retired cohorts. If one is interested in the expected returns of more recent
cohorts, then constructing artificial life cycles continues to be an indispensable exercise. Here lies a
task for dynamic microsimulation even as long panel data sets become more readily available.
We see several potential extensions to our model. On the one hand, heterogeneity in educational
careers and its impact on returns could be further analyzed. For instance, researchers will be able to
model the careers of bachelor degree holders when a larger part of such life cycles will be observed. In
addition, it might be interesting to explore the effects of dropout on the returns to higher education.
On the other hand, future studies might account for the effect of the statutory pension, health and
long-term care insurance over the whole life cycle, incorporating also differences in life expectancy and
further health outcomes between education levels.
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Appendix
A.1 Further simulation assumptions
Vocational and academic training
We assume that individuals spend six (three) years in higher education (vocational training). Further-
more, we ignore any potential educational breaks between graduation from school and the beginning
of post-secondary education. We use the SOEP to compute mean levels of gross labor income during
this period. Following this approach, we assign students in higher education a monthly income of
392 Euros, while vocational trainees receive 744 Euros. In addition, students in higher education
(vocational training) receive 109 (252) Euros per month as a student grant (part of BAföG), which
is the unconditional mean BAföG payment given as a grant. To quantify the fiscal returns, we assign
each higher education (vocational training) place the mean cost of 6500 (4600) Euros per year.
Family formation
We assume that each individual is either single or married and if married, is living in a joint household
with the spouse. Changes between these two states occur by marriage and divorce and new spouses
are selected from within the base population.51 Due to dynamic aging, spouses have to be of same
age. Therefore, we align marriages uniformly to the marriage target of women.52 When parents are
simulated to divorce, their children are assumed to stay in the mother’s household. Also, the children
that are born to single women are not assigned to single men. Children are assumed to leave the
household at age 18.
Employment
Labor market experience is updated every age year after the simulation of the current employment
state. We assume that part-time employment states increase labor market experience by half a year
while full-time states increase experience by one year. For tenure, we define an additional target
that defines the age-specific share of working individuals that change their employer from one year to
another, conditional on being employed in both periods. This target is defined separately by gender
and educational degree. In our simulation, the target rates are used to randomly select working
individuals to either stay with their current employer or change to a new employer.
We account for the empirical observation that episodes of involuntary unemployment tend to last
51In the microsimulation literature this is called a “closed model”.
52We opt for the female instead of the male marriage pattern since timing of marriages is closely related to the timing
of births, which are more relevant for female than for male labor supply.
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less than a year for a large fraction of individuals entering unemployment. We do this by re-setting the
length of one-year unemployment spells to three months. Accordingly, we assume that the other nine
months of that year are equally split to the employment state of the preceding and the subsequent
year, respectively.
Wages
Having estimated the hourly wage regressions we predict individual wages and store the residuals. At
the beginning of each new employment episode, we assign each individual a random draw from the
distribution of log wage residuals, depending on educational attainment, gender, and self-employment
status. This can be interpreted as the result of a matching process between employee and employer.
Moreover, individuals are randomly assigned to an economic sector as well as the position on the labor
market (self-employed, civil servant or otherwise employed) based on the observed shares in the SOEP
data and depending on educational attainment and gender. All monetary values are in 2019 prices.
Savings and wealth
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that in each period individuals accumulate savings according to
an age-specific average savings rate as estimated by Brenke and Pfannkuche (2018), yielding capital
income in each period, calculated under the hypothesis of a real interest of 2%. As in Haan et al.
(2017), we assume that if, in a given period, the household’s disposable income is below the minimum
income level that social assistance guarantees, and if the social assistance wealth test is not passed,
this household dis-saves the amount that is necessary to reach the minimum income level.
Taxes and social security contributions
The microsimulation takes into account the main features of the German income tax and social security
contributions (SSC) regime. We simulate employee’s and employer’s SSC to health, long-term care,
and unemployment insurance based on the individual status in the labor market. We exclude the
pension system from our analysis. This implies that contributions as well as benefits related to social
and private pension are set to zero throughout the simulated part of the life cycles.53 Self-employed
persons and civil servants are free to choose between private health insurance and voluntary public
health insurance, therefore we randomly assign them to one of the two options according to income-
quintile-specific shares observed in the SOEP. For those privately insured, we impute contributions
53Pension benefits are partly subject to (progressive) income taxation in Germany, which undermines our proportion-
ality argument. At the same time, not accounting for the (regressive) effect of the deduction of old-age contributions
should counteract this bias.
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based on age-gender-specific average contributions reported in the SOEP. Since the share of privately
insured individuals differs between levels of educational attainment, we also take the costs of public
health insurance into account, i.e. for those privately insured, the public health system is assumed to
save the age-gender-specific average annual cost of public health care.54
For the simulation of personal income taxes, we compute taxable income using the simulated income
from self-employment, income from dependent employment, income from capital, and by deducting
the lump-sum allowances and deductible expenses such as the simulated SSC. We further assume that
married couples always opt for joint taxation of income due to the financial gains of income splitting
in Germany. Concerning the intra-household division of the tax burden, we work on the assumption
that all couple households split taxes according to tax class IV/IV and the so-called factor method
(Faktorverfahren), which both reflects the financial gain of income splitting and income differences
within a couple. We also apply the higher-yield test between child benefit and child tax allowance, as
is implemented in the tax laws. Finally, for earnings from interest we apply the higher-yield test that
compares tax levels to the flat rate withholding tax scheme.
For the simulation of value added taxes (VAT) we follow the simple approach proposed in Pfeiffer
and Stichnoth (2019), who calculate fiscal revenue from VAT using simulated disposable income and
a hypothetical uniform VAT level (16,712%) computed by Böhringer and Wiegard (2013) as the
budget-neutral equivalent of the existing system incorporating two product-group specific VAT levels
and a pseudo tax exemption for housing and insurance expenditures, inter alia. However, we define
disposable income less savings as the relevant tax base.
Welfare programs
We simulate unemployment benefits, parental leave allowances and public student grants on the indi-
vidual level, and social assistance, housing benefits, child benefits and additional child benefits on the
household level. Insofar as transfer rules refer to individual needs that are not simulated within the
model (e.g. housing costs, heating costs), upper thresholds as specified by law are applied.
54Average health costs are taken from Statistisches Bundesamt (2017).
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Figure A1: Observed vs. predicted patterns of family formation, women
(a) Marriage rate (b) Divorce rate
(c) Fertility rate
Notes: Observed aggregate marriage, divorce and fertility rates are displayed by birth cohort. For instance, the line
“1970-1979” states the marriage, divorce, and fertility rates of the individuals born between 1970 and 1979 over the life
cycle as observed in the data. Simulation: predicted life-cycle pattern for the 1980–89 cohort. Source: Calculations
based on Statistisches Bundesamt (2019b), Statistisches Bundesamt (2019c), Statistisches Bundesamt (2004–2017a),
Statistisches Bundesamt (2004–2017b), and own simulations.
45
Figure A2: Observed vs. predicted patterns of labor market participation, women
(a) Labor force participation rate (b) Reduced part-time employment rate
(c) Standard part-time employment rate (d) Extended part-time employment rate
(e) Full-time employment rate (f) Over-time employment rate
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(g) Unemployment
Notes: Observed aggregate rates are shown as three-year moving averages and by birth cohort. Employment shares
in subfigures (b)–(g) conditional on labor force participation. Simulation: predicted life-cycle pattern for the 1980–89
cohort. Source: Own calculations based on SOEP v35, and own simulations.
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Figure A3: Observed vs. predicted patterns of labor market participation, men
(a) Labor force participation rate (b) Standard part-time employment rate
(c) Full-time employment rate (d) Over-time employment rate
(e) Unemployment rate
Notes: Observed aggregate rates are shown as three-year moving averages and by birth cohort. Employment shares
in subfigures (b)–(e) conditional on labor force participation. Simulation: predicted life-cycle pattern for the 1980–89
cohort. Source: Own calculations based on SOEP v35, and own simulations.
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Notes: Autocorrelations with one-, five-, and ten-year lags. Observed values are moving averages of order three for
cohorts starting from birth year 1950, weighted by the SOEP weighting factors. Simulated values are averaged over a
set of 100 simulations. Source: Own calculations based on SOEP v35, and own simulations.
49








20 30 40 50 60 70
age
SOEP (1 yr) Simulation (1 yr)
SOEP (5 yr) Simulation (5 yr)








20 30 40 50 60 70
age
SOEP (1 yr) Simulation (1 yr)
SOEP (5 yr) Simulation (5 yr)








20 30 40 50 60 70
age
SOEP (1 yr) Simulation (1 yr)
SOEP (5 yr) Simulation (5 yr)








20 30 40 50 60 70
age
SOEP (1 yr) Simulation (1 yr)
SOEP (5 yr) Simulation (5 yr)








20 30 40 50 60 70
age
SOEP (1 yr) Simulation (1 yr)
SOEP (5 yr) Simulation (5 yr)








20 30 40 50 60 70
age
SOEP (1 yr) Simulation (1 yr)
SOEP (5 yr) Simulation (5 yr)
SOEP (10 yr) Simulation (10 yr)
Notes: Autocorrelations with one-, five-, and ten-year lags. Observed values are moving averages of order three for
cohorts starting from birth year 1950, weighted by the SOEP weighting factors. Simulated values are averaged over a
set of 100 simulations. Source: Own calculations based on SOEP v35, and own simulations.
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20 30 40 50 60 70 20 30 40 50 60 70
No Degree Vocational w/o HEED
Vocational w/ HEED Academic
Out-of-LF / Unemployment Part-Time
Full-Time
Notes: For each combination of gender and education level, a sequence index plot displays 100 life cycles randomly drawn
from the universe of simulated individuals. ”Out-of-LF / Unemployment” are episodes out of labor force (not including
academic and vocational training) or in involuntary unemployment. ”Part-Time” includes episodes of employment with
1-34 weekly working hours. Episodes in ”Full-Time” comprise employment states with at least 35 weekly working hours.
Sequences are sorted according to the Levenshtein distance to a reference individual with the highest number of years
in full-time employment (Brzinsky-Fay et al., 2006). Source: Own simulations.
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20 30 40 50 60 70 20 30 40 50 60 70
No Degree Vocational w/o HEED
Vocational w/ HEED Academic
Unmarried, no children Married, no children
Married, with children
Notes: For each combination of gender and education level, a sequence index plot displays 100 life cycles randomly drawn
from the universe of simulated individuals. Sequences are sorted according to the Levenshtein distance to a reference
individual without any marriages or births over the life cycle (Brzinsky-Fay et al., 2006). As in our model children are
assumed to stay in their mothers’ households after parental divorce, ”unmarried, with children” episodes are not possible
for men by construction. Source: Own simulations.
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Figure A8: Distribution of NPVs of higher education attainment, all runs separately
(a) Women, gross income (b) Men, gross income
(c) Women, net income (d) Men, net income
Notes: Density functions for individual simulation runs displayed in light grey, single density function for pooled runs in
black. For married couples, 50% income pooling is assumed. Source: Own simulations.
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Figure A9: Median private NPV by discount rate
Notes: Median private NPVs of higher education by discount rate and income concept,
averaged over 100 runs. For married couples, 50% income pooling is assumed. Source: Own
simulations.
Figure A10: Median fiscal NPV by discount rate
Notes: Median fiscal NPVs of higher education by discount rate and income concept, aver-
aged over 100 runs. Source: Own simulations.
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Figure A11: Simulated hourly wage profiles by level of education and gender.
(a) Men (b) Women
Notes: The figure depicts simulated gross hourly wages in Euros in 2019 prices conditional on employment, which are
based on different wage regressions, either including or excluding the estimation of birth cohort effects (cohort groups
being defined in intervals of twenty years). “Voc. w/ HEED” = Vocational degree with higher education entrance degree.
Source: Own simulations.
Figure A12: Simulated age-earnings profiles by level of education and gender.
(a) Men (b) Women
Notes: The figure depicts simulated gross labor earnings in Euros in 2019 prices, with hourly wages based on different
wage regressions, either including or excluding the estimation of birth cohort effects (cohort groups being defined in
intervals of twenty years). “Voc. w/ HEED” = Vocational degree with higher education entrance degree. Source: Own
simulations.
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Figure A13: Simulated and observed hourly wage profiles by level of education and gender.
(a) Men, vocational degree with HEED (b) Women, vocational degree with HEED
(c) Men, higher education degree (d) Women, higher education degree
Notes: The figure depicts simulated and observed gross hourly wages in Euros. The shown simulated wage profiles
are for the estimation without cohort effects. The observed wages are shown for different birth cohorts. Source: Own
simulations, SOEP v35.
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In academic training -0.710∗∗∗ -0.402∗∗
(0.176) (0.158)
In vocational training -0.585∗∗∗ -0.0102
(0.199) (0.203)
Child under 7 0.385∗∗∗ 0.854∗∗∗
(0.0976) (0.118)
Birth in t-1 1.357∗∗∗ 1.330∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.137)
Birth in t-2 0.660∗∗∗ 0.696∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.163)
Birth in t-3 0.344∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.161)
One divorce 0.492∗∗∗ 0.608∗∗∗
(0.0720) (0.0838)
Two or more divorces 1.351∗∗∗ 1.249∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.163)
Migration background 0.0903 0.336∗∗∗
(0.0729) (0.0824)
Unemployed in t-1 -0.484∗∗∗
(0.142)
Years of unemployment -0.0707∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗
(0.0122) (0.0258)
(Years of unemployment2)/10 0.0464∗∗∗
(0.0147)
In labor force in t-1 0.126
(0.0965)




Cohort dummies yes yes
Year dummies yes yes
Orthogonalized east dummy yes yes
N 38396 31841
Notes: Separate Logit estimations for women (column 1) and
men (2). Standard errors in parentheses. * / ** / ***: sta-
tistically significantly different from zero at the 10%- / 5%- /
1%-level.
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP v35, waves 1995–
2018.
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Table A2: Estimation results for the probability of divorcing, women
Age difference 0.0180
(0.0146)






Child under 7 -0.347
(0.298)








Orthogonalized east dummy yes
N 93842
Notes: Logit estimations using divorce of
a married couple as the dependent variable.
Standard errors in parentheses. * / ** / ***:
statistically significantly different from zero at
the 10%- / 5%- / 1%-level.
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP
v35, waves 1995–2018.
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Table A3: Estimation results for the probability of giving birth





One child -0.190∗∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗
(0.0652) (0.0793)
Two children -1.279∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗
(0.0794) (0.109)




In academic training -0.946∗∗∗ -1.219∗∗∗
(0.197) (0.153)
In vocational training -1.590∗∗∗ -1.047∗∗∗
(0.326) (0.162)
Migration background 0.125∗∗ 0.0242
(0.0499) (0.0825)
(Tenure in t-1)/10 0.426∗∗ 0.383∗
(0.175) (0.206)
(Tenure in t-1)2/100 -0.259∗∗ -0.336∗∗
(0.103) (0.145)
Empl. status in t-1 = 1 -0.144∗
(0.0858)
Empl. status in t-1 = 2 -0.331∗∗∗
(0.0902)
Empl. status in t-1 = 3 -0.198∗∗
(0.0843)
Empl. status in t-1 = 4 -0.297∗∗∗
(0.0963)
Empl. status in t-1 = 5 -0.421∗∗∗
(0.0865)




Cohort dummies yes yes
Year dummies yes yes
Orthogonalized east dummy yes yes
N 84670 53384
Notes: Separate Logit estimations for married (column 1) and single
women (2). Standard errors in parentheses. * / ** / ***: statistically
significantly different from zero at the 10%- / 5%- / 1%-level.
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP v35, waves 1995–2018.
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Table A4: Estimation results for the probability of labor force participation
Women Men
LFP=1 in t-1 2.913∗∗∗ 3.453∗∗∗
(0.0377) (0.0606)
LFP=1 in t-2 1.188∗∗∗ 1.375∗∗∗
(0.0429) (0.0819)
LFP=1 in t-3 0.545∗∗∗ 0.811∗∗∗
(0.0470) (0.0961)
LFP=1 in t-4 0.419∗∗∗ 0.407∗∗∗
(0.0489) (0.107)








Vocational w/ HEED -1.175 -4.139
(1.205) (2.560)
Vocational w/o HEED -2.335∗∗∗ -2.546∗
(0.742) (1.514)
Academic x Age 0.246∗∗∗ 0.0993
(0.0522) (0.110)
Vocational w/ HEED x Age 0.0855 0.217∗∗
(0.0548) (0.110)
Vocational w/o HEED x Age 0.137∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗
(0.0332) (0.0646)
Academic x Age2/100 -0.288∗∗∗ -0.182∗
(0.0544) (0.107)
Vocational w/ HEED x Age2/100 -0.105∗ -0.232∗∗
(0.0597) (0.114)
Vocational w/o HEED x Age2/100 -0.167∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗
(0.0355) (0.0668)
Birth in t -2.722∗∗∗
(0.0887)
Birth in t-1 -4.667∗∗∗
(0.0825)














Cohort dummies yes yes
Year dummies yes yes
Orthogonalized east dummy yes yes
N 75941 64296
Notes: Separate Logit estimations for women (column 1)
and men (2). “HEED”= Higher education entrance degree.
Standard errors in parentheses. * / ** / ***: statistically
significantly different from zero at the 10%- / 5%- / 1%-
level.
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP v35, waves 1995–
2018.
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Table A5: Estimation results for the probability of unemployment
Women Men
Years of unemployment 0.444∗∗∗ 0.524∗∗∗
(0.00843) (0.0102)
(Years of unemployment2)/10 -0.168∗∗∗ -0.208∗∗∗
(0.00473) (0.00578)
Years of employment -0.115∗∗∗ -0.0653∗∗∗
(0.00524) (0.00764)
(Years of employment2)/10 0.0234∗∗∗ 0.0108∗∗∗
(0.00129) (0.00151)
Empl. status in t-1 = 1 0.698∗∗∗ 0.630∗∗∗
(0.0377) (0.0525)
Empl. status in t-1 = 2 -2.150∗∗∗ -1.784∗∗∗
(0.0563) (0.0701)
Empl. status in t-1 = 3 -2.174∗∗∗ -1.927∗∗∗
(0.0519) (0.0514)
Empl. status in t-1 = 4 -2.128∗∗∗ -2.227∗∗∗
(0.0528) (0.0622)
Empl. status in t-1 = 5 -1.967∗∗∗
(0.0431)














Vocational w/ HEED -0.403∗∗∗ -0.260∗∗∗
(0.0520) (0.0651)








Cohort dummies yes yes
Year dummies yes yes
Orthogonalized east dummy yes yes
N 114514 117409
Notes: Separate Logit estimations for women (column 1) and
men (2). “HEED”= Higher education entrance degree. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses. * / ** / ***: statistically signifi-
cantly different from zero at the 10%- / 5%- / 1%-level.
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP v35, waves 1995–
2018. 61
Table A6: Employment states of women, Multinomial Logit estimates
Employment state
Part-time Ext. part-time Full-time Over-time
Reference category: Reduced part-time
Empl. status in t-1 = 1 0.499∗∗∗ 0.823∗∗∗ 0.818∗∗∗ 0.947∗∗∗
(0.0625) (0.0700) (0.0641) (0.103)
Empl. status in t-1 = 2 -0.849∗∗∗ -1.368∗∗∗ -1.784∗∗∗ -1.077∗∗∗
(0.0458) (0.0640) (0.0670) (0.108)
Empl. status in t-1 = 3 2.355∗∗∗ 1.483∗∗∗ 0.497∗∗∗ 1.098∗∗∗
(0.0483) (0.0589) (0.0625) (0.0978)
Empl. status in t-1 = 4 1.885∗∗∗ 4.354∗∗∗ 2.666∗∗∗ 2.956∗∗∗
(0.0713) (0.0736) (0.0743) (0.102)
Empl. status in t-1 = 5 1.247∗∗∗ 2.758∗∗∗ 4.725∗∗∗ 4.156∗∗∗
(0.0815) (0.0810) (0.0761) (0.0984)
Empl. status in t-1 = 6 1.225∗∗∗ 2.434∗∗∗ 3.574∗∗∗ 5.299∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.118) (0.110) (0.125)
Tenure 0.0262∗∗∗ 0.0285∗∗∗ 0.0303∗∗∗ 0.0207∗∗∗
(0.00214) (0.00234) (0.00242) (0.00285)
Years of full-time experience 0.0370∗∗∗ 0.0552∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗
(0.00536) (0.00596) (0.00627) (0.00786)
(Years of full-time experience2)/100 -0.0463∗∗∗ -0.0391∗∗ -0.160∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗
(0.0171) (0.0182) (0.0183) (0.0216)
Years of part-time experience 0.0315∗∗∗ 0.0241∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗ -0.0973∗∗∗
(0.00648) (0.00723) (0.00742) (0.00909)
(Years of part-time experience2)/100 -0.0305 0.0120 0.386∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗
(0.0205) (0.0233) (0.0248) (0.0317)
Self-employed -0.380∗∗∗ -0.301∗∗∗ -0.647∗∗∗ 1.262∗∗∗
(0.0564) (0.0635) (0.0654) (0.0645)
Academic 1.807∗∗∗ 2.027∗∗∗ 2.337∗∗∗ 2.679∗∗∗
(0.247) (0.265) (0.253) (0.298)
Vocational w/ HEED 0.856∗∗∗ 0.829∗∗∗ 0.691∗∗∗ 0.904∗∗∗
(0.250) (0.272) (0.261) (0.316)
Vocational w/o HEED 0.584∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗ -0.314∗ 0.182
(0.164) (0.182) (0.170) (0.212)
Age 0.876∗∗∗ 1.645∗∗∗ 1.380∗∗∗ 1.758∗∗∗
(0.236) (0.254) (0.233) (0.290)
Age2/10 -0.329∗∗∗ -0.658∗∗∗ -0.632∗∗∗ -0.750∗∗∗
(0.0880) (0.0959) (0.0892) (0.111)
Age3/100 0.0537∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.0141) (0.0155) (0.0146) (0.0182)
Age4/10,000 -0.0327∗∗∗ -0.0696∗∗∗ -0.0748∗∗∗ -0.0840∗∗∗
(0.00822) (0.00912) (0.00868) (0.0108)
Academic x Age -0.0262∗∗∗ -0.0281∗∗∗ -0.0356∗∗∗ -0.0421∗∗∗
(0.00552) (0.00597) (0.00578) (0.00682)
Vocational w/ HEED x Age -0.0105∗ -0.00941 -0.00920 -0.0160∗∗
(0.00577) (0.00633) (0.00622) (0.00756)
Vocational w/o HEED x Age -0.00924∗∗ -0.00645 0.00587 -0.00493
(0.00368) (0.00416) (0.00397) (0.00496)
Migration background -0.0456 0.0324 0.0752∗ 0.0500
(0.0368) (0.0416) (0.0418) (0.0524)
Married -0.216∗∗∗ -0.595∗∗∗ -0.792∗∗∗ -0.856∗∗∗
(0.0385) (0.0402) (0.0403) (0.0466)
Child under 7 0.0120 -0.250∗∗∗ -0.987∗∗∗ -1.061∗∗∗
(0.0422) (0.0474) (0.0490) (0.0647)
Constant -9.130∗∗∗ -15.39∗∗∗ -9.029∗∗∗ -15.62∗∗∗
(2.273) (2.416) (2.171) (2.719)
Cohort dummies Yes
Year dummies Yes
Orthogonalized east dummies Yes
N 106656
Notes: The table reports the coefficient estimates of a Multinomial Logit model with the
employment status as the dependent variable. Employment status 2 is the base category.
Each column reports the estimates of one category. Standard errors in parentheses. * /
** / ***: statistically significantly different from zero at the 10%- / 5%- / 1%-level.
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP v35, waves 1995–2018.
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Empl. status in t-1 = 1 0.537∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗
(0.0728) (0.0923)
Empl. status in t-1 = 2 -1.136∗∗∗ -0.899∗∗∗
(0.0656) (0.0871)
Empl. status in t-1 = 3 2.880∗∗∗ 2.230∗∗∗
(0.0643) (0.0807)




Years of full-time experience 0.0639∗∗∗ 0.0967∗∗∗
(0.00849) (0.00931)
(Years of full-time experience2)/100 0.0123 -0.0391∗∗
(0.0177) (0.0193)
Years of part-time experience -0.303∗∗∗ -0.327∗∗∗
(0.0119) (0.0134)






Vocational w/ HEED 0.330∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗
(0.0768) (0.0816)
















Orthogonalized east dummies Yes
N 106656
Notes: The table reports the coefficient estimates of a Multi-
nomial Logit model with the employment status as the de-
pendent variable. Employment status 2 is the base category.
Each column reports the estimates of one category. Standard
errors in parentheses. * / ** / ***: statistically significantly
different from zero at the 10%- / 5%- / 1%-level.
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP v35, waves 1995–
2018.
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Table A8: OLS wage regressions, no cohort effects
Women, academic Men, academic Women, vocational Men, vocational
Experience/10 0.266∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗ 0.230∗
(0.0955) (0.0988) (0.100) (0.123)
Experience2/100 -0.110 -0.299∗∗∗ -0.255∗∗ -0.0674
(0.0930) (0.0910) (0.102) (0.115)
Experience3/1,000 0.0258 0.0709∗∗ 0.0635 0.0162
(0.0347) (0.0321) (0.0394) (0.0418)
Experience4/100,000 -0.0233 -0.0637∗ -0.0617 -0.0152
(0.0429) (0.0373) (0.0495) (0.0501)
Tenure/10 0.423∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗
(0.0585) (0.0530) (0.0573) (0.0732)
Tenure2/100 -0.257∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗ -0.109 -0.237∗∗∗
(0.0684) (0.0595) (0.0720) (0.0873)
Tenure3/1,000 0.0860∗∗∗ 0.0743∗∗∗ 0.0293 0.0681∗
(0.0285) (0.0239) (0.0314) (0.0366)
Tenure4/100,000 -0.110∗∗∗ -0.0842∗∗∗ -0.0302 -0.0665
(0.0384) (0.0309) (0.0425) (0.0490)
Age/10 3.403∗∗∗ 2.982∗∗ 2.585∗∗ 1.684
(1.202) (1.362) (1.170) (1.408)
Age2/100 -1.009∗∗ -0.849∗ -0.950∗∗ -0.472
(0.436) (0.476) (0.442) (0.529)
Age3/1,000 0.129∗ 0.108 0.148∗∗ 0.0582
(0.0685) (0.0719) (0.0724) (0.0856)
Age4/100,000 -0.0613 -0.0509 -0.0863∗∗ -0.0294
(0.0395) (0.0397) (0.0433) (0.0508)
Migration background -0.0929∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗
(0.0254) (0.0215) (0.0174) (0.0214)
Constant -1.648 -1.212 -0.232 0.390
(1.211) (1.416) (1.116) (1.354)
Orthog. state dummies yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes
N 22273 26994 13571 11193
Notes: Separate wage OLS regressions based on gender and education group. Dependent variable is the gross
hourly wage. Standard errors clustered on the individual level shown in parentheses. * / ** / ***: statistically
significantly different from zero at the 10%- / 5%- / 1%-level.
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP v35, waves 1984–2018.
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Table A10: OLS wage regressions, 20-year cohorts
Women, academic Men, academic Women, vocational Men, vocational
Experience/10 0.271∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗ 0.233∗
(0.0954) (0.0988) (0.101) (0.122)
Experience2/100 -0.120 -0.304∗∗∗ -0.248∗∗ -0.0737
(0.0928) (0.0911) (0.103) (0.114)
Experience3/1,000 0.0300 0.0730∗∗ 0.0619 0.0194
(0.0346) (0.0321) (0.0401) (0.0414)
Experience4/100,000 -0.0283 -0.0662∗ -0.0604 -0.0190
(0.0427) (0.0373) (0.0509) (0.0496)
Tenure/10 0.424∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗
(0.0585) (0.0530) (0.0574) (0.0731)
Tenure2/100 -0.259∗∗∗ -0.247∗∗∗ -0.105 -0.245∗∗∗
(0.0683) (0.0596) (0.0722) (0.0871)
Tenure3/1,000 0.0878∗∗∗ 0.0750∗∗∗ 0.0275 0.0712∗
(0.0284) (0.0240) (0.0315) (0.0366)
Tenure4/100,000 -0.113∗∗∗ -0.0853∗∗∗ -0.0281 -0.0705
(0.0383) (0.0309) (0.0428) (0.0490)
Age/10 3.443∗∗∗ 3.028∗∗ 2.593∗∗ 1.639
(1.201) (1.360) (1.176) (1.391)
Age2/100 -1.023∗∗ -0.869∗ -0.938∗∗ -0.440
(0.435) (0.475) (0.444) (0.522)
Age3/1,000 0.131∗ 0.111 0.144∗∗ 0.0489
(0.0684) (0.0718) (0.0727) (0.0845)
Age4/100,000 -0.0622 -0.0527 -0.0820∗ -0.0218
(0.0395) (0.0397) (0.0436) (0.0499)
Migration background -0.0884∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗ -0.243∗∗∗
(0.0255) (0.0216) (0.0174) (0.0215)
Cohort 1930 -0.0463 0.0227 -0.0709 0.0800
(0.0490) (0.0432) (0.0671) (0.0777)
Cohort 1950 0.00352 0.0213 0.0139 0.0688∗∗
(0.0268) (0.0245) (0.0276) (0.0328)
Constant -1.557 -1.080 -0.169 0.498
(1.207) (1.415) (1.126) (1.337)
Orthog. state dummies yes yes yes yes
Orthog. year dummies yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes
N 22273 26994 13571 11193
Notes: Separate wage OLS regressions based on gender and education group. Dependent variable is the gross
hourly wage. Standard errors clustered on the individual level shown in parentheses. * / ** / ***: statistically
significantly different from zero at the 10%- / 5%- / 1%-level. Cohort dummies are based on 20-year birth year
cohorts, with base category the 1970–89 cohort.
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP v35, waves 1984–2018.
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Table A12: Fractional regression models for age-specific household formation patterns of women
Births Marriages Divorces
Age 54.711∗∗∗ 4.140∗∗∗ 10.094∗∗∗
(2.882) (0.612) (0.990)
Age2/10 -43.939∗∗∗ -1.482∗∗∗ -5.430∗∗∗
(2.528) (0.372) (0.599)
Age3/102 18.620∗∗∗ 0.176 1.550∗∗∗
(1.158) (0.116) (0.186)
Age4/104 -43.924∗∗∗ 0.108 -2.456∗∗∗
(2.924) (0.198) (0.315)
Age5/106 54.632∗∗∗ -0.383∗∗ 2.033∗∗∗
(3.864) (0.174) (0.275)
Age6/108 -28.031∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ -0.686∗∗∗
(2.090) (0.062) (0.097)
Birth year/10 -8.600∗∗∗ -0.061 -0.143∗∗
(1.359) (0.300) (0.069)
Birth year2/102 6.407∗∗∗ 0.125
(1.105) (0.247)
Birth year3/103 -2.663∗∗∗ 0.067
(0.446) (0.166)
Birth year4/105 5.856∗∗∗ -0.432
(0.953) (0.487)
Birth year5/107 -6.558∗∗∗ 0.795
(1.031) (0.651)
Birth year6/109 2.941∗∗∗ -0.503
(0.445) (0.329)
Age x birth year / 102 0.412∗∗∗
(0.012)




Year ≥ 1991 -0.134∗∗∗
(0.015)
Constant -278.566∗∗∗ -43.611∗∗∗ -81.888∗∗∗
(13.379) (4.089) (6.533)
N 1573 862 176
Notes: Fractional regression models with age and birth year specific
shares as dependent variables. Standard errors in parentheses. * / **
/ ***: statistically significantly different from zero at the 10%- / 5%- /
1%-level.
Source: Own calculations based on Statistisches Bundesamt (2019b,c)
for fertility, on Statistisches Bundesamt (2004–2017a) for marriages, and
on Statistisches Bundesamt (2004–2017b) for divorces.
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Table A13: Fractional regression models for age-specific LFP/UE patterns
Labor force participation Unemployment
Women Men Women Men
Age 34.267∗∗∗ 4.733∗∗∗ 1.895∗∗∗ 1.938∗∗∗
(1.540) (0.156) (0.182) (0.173)
Age2/10 -21.369∗∗∗ -1.618∗∗∗ -0.776∗∗∗ -0.813∗∗∗
(1.034) (0.060) (0.073) (0.069)
Age3/102 6.866∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗
(0.358) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
Age4/104 -12.030∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.084∗∗∗









Age x birth year / 102 0.092∗∗∗
(0.009)
Year ≥ 1991 -0.009 -0.186∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗ 0.672∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.065) (0.054) (0.053)
Unemployment rate/102 -5.387∗∗∗ -5.395∗∗∗ 8.473∗∗∗ 5.105∗∗∗
(0.574) (0.974) (0.808) (0.814)
Constant -221.453∗∗∗ -46.340∗∗∗ -19.649∗∗∗ -19.216∗∗∗
(9.218) (1.506) (1.624) (1.564)
N 1,699 1,699 1,698 1,699
Notes: Fractional regression models with age and birth year specific shares as dependent
variables. Standard errors in parentheses. * / ** / ***: statistically significantly
different from zero at the 10%- / 5%- / 1%-level.
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP v35, waves 1984–2018.
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Table A14: Fractional regression models for age-specific employment state
Women Men
Part-time Ext. part-time Full-time Over-time Full-time Over-time
Ref. category: Reduced part-time Ref. category: Part-time
Age 13.428∗∗∗ 33.586∗∗∗ 29.234∗∗∗ 24.628∗∗∗ 2.433∗∗∗ 2.912∗∗∗
(3.371) (3.459) (2.713) (3.476) (0.187) (0.221)
Age2/10 -8.157∗∗∗ -21.809∗∗∗ -18.514∗∗∗ -14.806∗∗∗ -1.006∗∗∗ -1.097∗∗∗
(2.294) (2.342) (1.856) (2.360) (0.074) (0.087)
Age3/102 2.579∗∗∗ 7.324∗∗∗ 6.004∗∗∗ 4.525∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(0.804) (0.817) (0.653) (0.826) (0.012) (0.015)
Age4/104 -4.489∗∗∗ -13.471∗∗∗ -10.631∗∗∗ -7.478∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗
(1.534) (1.556) (1.251) (1.575) (0.008) (0.009)
Age5/106 4.093∗∗∗ 12.922∗∗∗ 9.826∗∗∗ 6.386∗∗∗
(1.515) (1.534) (1.240) (1.556)
Age6/108 -1.535∗∗ -5.070∗∗∗ -3.726∗∗∗ -2.218∗∗∗
(0.607) (0.614) (0.498) (0.623)
Year ≥ 1991 -0.333∗∗∗ -0.299∗∗∗ -0.065 -0.415∗∗∗ -0.281∗∗∗ -0.413∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.075) (0.065) (0.086) (0.087) (0.093)
Year ≥ 2001 -0.176∗∗ -0.276∗∗∗ -0.409∗∗∗ -0.494∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗ -0.013
(0.078) (0.072) (0.071) (0.090) (0.078) (0.085)
Unemp. rate/102 -1.708 -3.390∗∗∗ -3.076∗∗∗ -1.460 -3.944∗∗∗ -0.481
(1.263) (1.196) (1.120) (1.484) (1.335) (1.502)
Constant -89.121∗∗∗ -208.255∗∗∗ -180.310∗∗∗ -160.962∗∗∗ -16.493∗∗∗ -24.913∗∗∗
(19.849) (20.531) (15.898) (20.590) (1.693) (2.001)
Cohort dummies Yes Yes
N 1624 1624
Notes: Fractional regression models with age and birth year specific shares as dependent variables. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses. * / ** / ***: statistically significantly different from zero at the 10%- / 5%- /
1%-level.
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP v35, waves 1984–2018.
Table A15: Years per labor market status over the life-cycle, by degree
LFP UE EMP PT FT
Yrs Lgth Yrs Lgth Yrs Lgth Yrs Lgth Yrs Lgth
Women
No Degree 37.1 12.6 6.2 3.0 30.9 8.4 13.7 4.7 17.2 5.3
Voc w/o HEED 41.9 13.3 4.0 2.2 37.8 9.5 20.7 6.1 17.1 5.6
Voc w/ HEED 40.0 12.5 3.2 1.8 36.8 9.2 19.2 5.8 17.6 5.4
Academic 37.3 12.4 2.1 1.2 35.2 9.4 14.5 4.9 20.7 5.8
Overall 39.3 12.7 3.6 2.0 35.7 9.2 17.4 5.5 18.3 5.6
Men
No Degree 45.2 30.7 6.5 3.2 38.7 13.9 6.7 3.0 32.0 9.5
Voc w/o HEED 45.8 31.5 4.9 2.6 40.8 15.3 5.9 2.7 35.0 10.4
Voc w/ HEED 44.2 29.7 3.5 2.1 40.7 15.9 5.4 2.6 35.3 10.7
Academic 41.1 28.6 1.7 1.0 39.4 16.6 6.9 3.3 32.5 10.7
Overall 44.1 30.2 4.1 2.3 40.0 15.5 6.2 2.9 33.8 10.3
Notes: “Yrs” are simulated average years spent in a specific labor market state. “Lgth” is the average length of
a labor market spell. LFP stands for labor force participation, UE for unemployment, EMP for employment,
PT for part-time employment, and FT for full-time employment. “HEED” means higher education entrance
degree. Source: Own calculations.
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Table A16: Number and length of marriages over the life-cycle, by degree
Total
Share with ... marriages Spell length Age at
1st marr.0 1 ≥2 overall uncens.
Women
No Degree 0.85 0.26 0.63 0.11 27.89 8.80 29.36
Voc w/o HEED 0.84 0.30 0.58 0.12 25.47 8.70 29.86
Voc w/ HEED 0.83 0.30 0.59 0.11 24.48 8.40 32.59
Academic 0.78 0.33 0.57 0.10 22.06 8.03 36.55
Overall 0.82 0.30 0.59 0.11 24.65 8.47 32.32
Men
No Degree 0.95 0.31 0.50 0.19 25.92 8.69 30.07
Voc w/o HEED 0.62 0.53 0.35 0.12 23.67 8.40 33.46
Voc w/ HEED 0.80 0.41 0.43 0.16 24.96 8.58 31.05
Academic 0.86 0.36 0.47 0.17 24.47 8.31 32.17
Overall 0.78 0.42 0.43 0.15 24.65 8.47 31.87
Notes: The table displays the average number of marriages, the share of individuals with a certain number of
marriages, the average spell length of a marriage, and age at first marriage for the simulated cohort. Uncensored
spells comprise spells that are observed to be divorced before the age of 67 only (no right-censored spells). Source:
Own calculations.
Table A17: Women’s births over the life-cycle, by degree
Birth rate
Share with ... births Age at 1st
birth0 1 2 ≥3
No Degree 1.88 0.17 0.17 0.41 0.25 27.36
Voc w/o HEED 1.71 0.19 0.18 0.43 0.20 27.95
Voc w/ HEED 1.70 0.21 0.17 0.42 0.20 29.62
Academic 1.56 0.26 0.19 0.38 0.17 31.98
Overall 1.69 0.21 0.18 0.41 0.20 29.37
Notes: The table displays the average number of births, the share of women with a certain number of births,
and average age at first birth for the simulated cohort. Source: Own calculations.
Table A18: Number of divorces over the life-cycle, by degree
Divorce rate
Share with ... divorces Age at 1st
divorce0 1 ≥2
Women
No Degree 0.24 0.79 0.19 0.02 36.24
Voc w/o HEED 0.28 0.75 0.22 0.03 36.84
Voc w/ HEED 0.25 0.78 0.20 0.02 38.77
Academic 0.21 0.81 0.17 0.02 41.31
Overall 0.25 0.78 0.20 0.02 38.36
Men
No Degree 0.28 0.79 0.15 0.05 35.09
Voc w/o HEED 0.19 0.85 0.11 0.03 38.36
Voc w/ HEED 0.25 0.81 0.14 0.05 37.26
Academic 0.26 0.80 0.15 0.05 38.59
Overall 0.24 0.82 0.14 0.04 37.53
Notes: The table displays the average number of divorces, the share of individuals with a certain number of
divorces, and average age at first divorce for the simulated cohort. Source: Own calculations.
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